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Abstract
We show theoretically that infl ation disagreement drives a wedge between real and nominal 
yields and raises their levels and volatilities. We demonstrate empirically that an infl ation 
disagreement increase of one standard deviation raises real and nominal yields and their 
volatilities, break-even infl ation, and the infl ation risk premium by at least 30% of their respective 
standard deviations. Infl ation disagreement is positively related to consumers’ cross-sectional 
consumption growth volatility and trading in bonds, interest rate futures, and infl ation swaps. 
Calibrating the model to disagreement, infl ation, and yield data reproduces the economically 
signifi cant impact of infl ation disagreement on real and nominal yield curves.
Keywords: infl ation disagreement, relative entropy, real and nominal yields, yield volatilities, 
break-even infl ation, infl ation risk premium, cross-sectional consumption growth volatility, 
trading on infl ation.
JEL classifi cation: D51, E43, E52, G12.
Resumen
Este trabajo muestra cómo las discrepancias en torno a la infl ación esperada abren una brecha 
entre las rentabilidades reales y nominales y elevan sus niveles y volatilidades. Se demuestra 
empíricamente que un incremento de estas discrepancias en una desviación estándar 
aumenta las rentabilidades reales y nominales y sus volatilidades, la infl ación break-even y la 
prima de riesgo de infl ación por lo menos en el 30 % de sus respectivas desviaciones estándar. 
Las discrepancias en torno a la infl ación esperada están positivamente relacionadas con 
la volatilidad de sección cruzada del crecimiento del consumo y con la participación de los 
consumidores en los mercados de bonos, futuros sobre tipos de interés y swaps de infl ación. 
La calibración del modelo a los datos de discrepancias en la infl ación esperada, infl ación y 
rentabilidades reproduce el impacto económicamente signifi cativo de las discrepancias en torno 
a la infl ación esperada sobre las curvas de rentabilidades reales y nominales.
Palabras clave: discrepancias en torno a la infl ación esperada, entropía relativa, rentabilidades 
reales y nominales, volatilidades de las rentabilidades, infl ación break-even, prima de riesgo 
de infl ación, volatilidad de sección cruzada del crecimiento del consumo, trading en infl ación.
Códigos JEL: D51, E43, E52, G12.
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Empirical evidence from survey data, such as the early work of Mankiw, Reis, and
Wolfers (2004), shows that households, as well as professional forecasters, have different
opinions about inflation. For example in June 2014, the interquartile range of annual inflation
expectations is 1.7% to 5.0%, according to the Michigan Surveys of Consumers, and 1.7%
to 2.2%, according to the Survey of Professional Forecasters. Figure 1 shows that inflation
disagreement for both consumers and professional forecasters also varies substantially over
time. Here inflation disagreement is defined as the cross-sectional standard deviation of
inflation forecasts across survey participants.
Sims (2009) discusses how time-varying inflation disagreement could arise:
“For example in the period 1975-2000, the wide swings in US fiscal policy could
easily have led to differing views about the implications of those swings for fu-
ture inflation. And in the late 90s in the US, when unemployment and interest
rates stayed persistently low, there were differences of view even among specialist
economists about the long term implications for the inflation rate.”
Malmendier and Nagel (2014) show that differences in life-time experiences of consumers lead
to disagreement about expected inflation. Stock and Watson (2010) discuss the difficulties
faced by professional forecasters in building inflation forecasting models. All of this evidence
points toward the difficulties faced by households and professionals in accounting for inflation,
which in turn, generates heterogeneity in investment and consumption decisions. For example
as Malmendier and Nagel (2014) show, households who think that inflation will be high
are more likely to borrow using fixed-rate mortgages and less likely to invest in long term
bonds. Professional investors struggle with their views toward inflation too. For example,
PIMCO’s Total Return Fund bet on increased inflation after the Great Recession, which
never materialized.1 Given this evidence, we study theoretically and empirically how inflation
disagreement impacts real and nominal Treasury bonds.
We consider a frictionless exchange economy with complete markets. Investors disagree
about inflation, so they make different consumption-savings decisions because they perceive
different real returns on investments. Thus, inflation disagreement raises the cross-sectional
consumption growth volatility. Moreover, each investor perceives high real returns on their
investments and so they think they will become wealthier. As consumption today is fixed
in a pure exchange economy, real rates adjust for markets to clear. Therefore, inflation dis-
agreement raises real yields and their volatilities relative to the no-disagreement benchmark,
1See, for example, thereformedbroker.com/2014/09/28/do-we-need-to-fire-pimco/.
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Figure 1: Inflation Disagreement of Consumers and Professionals
The blue solid line shows the cross-sectional standard deviation of one year ahead inflation
expectations from the Michigan Surveys of Consumers at a monthly frequency, while the
red dashed line shows the same measure from the Survey of Professional Forecasters at a
quarterly frequency. The shaded regions denote NBER-dated recessions.
if the wealth effect dominates the substitution effect.2 We show that these results are robust
to the particular form of inflation disagreement. So, investors can disagree about the joint
distribution of inflation and consumption, not just expected inflation, as long as they agree
on the distribution of consumption.
To study the effect of changes in disagreement on real yields and the cross-sectional
consumption growth volatility, we measure inflation disagreement more generally as the
relative entropy of investors’ inflation beliefs. This measure allows us to show that real yields
and the cross-sectional consumption growth volatility increase with inflation disagreement
when investors disagree about higher order moments of the inflation distribution, not just
the mean, or have beliefs that do not even belong to the same class of distributions. In all
our examples, real yield volatilities also increase in relative entropy.
The effects of inflation disagreement on nominal yields are ambiguous without making
additional assumptions about investors inflation beliefs because investors may agree on a
high expected inflation rate or disagree on a very low expected inflation rate, in which
case it is impossible to compare nominal yields. We show that nominal yields increases
2The real yield is decreasing, if the substitution effect dominates, which would require a risk aversion
coefficient less than one with power utility and would be inconsistent with habit preferences.
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with inflation disagreement when holding the consumption-weighted belief about the mean
and risk premium of inflation in the respective homogeneous belief economies constant.
This result does not immediately follow from an increase in real yields because inflation
disagreement also drives a wedge between real and nominal yields as investors require an
inflation risk premium for changes in the investment opportunity set due to speculative
inflation trades. In all our examples, nominal yield volatilities are also higher with than
without disagreement.
Empirically, we find broad support for our theoretical results. We use the Surveys of
Consumers from the University of Michigan and the Survey of Professional Forecasters to
compute an inflation disagreement measure for consumers and professionals, respectively.
Statistically, real and nominal yields across all maturities increase with inflation disagree-
ment. The effect of inflation disagreement on the real and nominal yield curve is also econom-
ically significant. An increase in disagreement of consumers/professionals by one standard
deviation raises real yields on average by 58%/39% of their standard deviation and nominal
yields on average by 54%/36% of their standard deviations. In addition, the volatilities of
real and nominal yields increase with inflation disagreement and the coefficient estimates also
have large economic significance. When inflation disagreement of consumers/professionals
rises by one standard deviation, volatilities of real and nominal yields rise on average by
41%/63% and 48%/61% of their standard deviations.
Inflation disagreement not only shifts real and nominal yield curves up, but it also
drives a wedge between real and nominal yields. Statistically, inflation disagreement of
consumers/professionals raises the break-even inflation rate and the inflation risk premium at
all maturities. When inflation disagreement of consumers/professionals rises by one standard
deviation, break-even inflation rates rise on average by 60%/36% and inflation risk premiums
by 72%/56% of their respective standard deviations.
To further strengthen our empirical results, we explore the channel through which infla-
tion disagreement affects real and nominal Treasury bonds. Specifically, we use the Consumer
Expenditure (CEX) Survey to verify that there is a positive relation between cross-sectional
consumption growth volatility and inflation disagreement. The drawback of using cross-
sectional consumption growth volatility is that the CEX data are of poorer quality than
data based on trade in financial markets. Hence, we also show that inflation disagreement
has a statistically positive effect on trading in nominal Treasury bonds, fixed income futures,
and inflation swaps. These securities have very low basis risk and thus investors may use
them to directly trade on their inflation beliefs.
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results. To accomplish this, we consider a continuous-time model with two investors who
disagree about the dynamics of expected inflation. We also allow for habits to help match
asset pricing moments. The model admits closed-form solutions for bond prices,3 is rich
enough to capture average yields and yield volatilities, and generates upward sloping real
and nominal yield curves. To compare the model to the data, we calibrate the inflation
disagreement to the Survey of Professional Forecasters. In particular, we match the average
and volatility of the disagreement and the mean and volatility of the consensus forecast. The
calibrated model shows an economic significant relation between inflation disagreement and
real and nominal yields and their volatilities with a reasonable risk premium and Sharpe
ratio for inflation risk. The statistical and economic significance of inflation disagreement in
model-based regressions are also very similar to the data.
Our paper is part of a growing literature that studies how disagreement impacts bond
markets.4 In earlier work, Doepke and Schneider (2006) quantitatively explore the impact
of inflation on the U.S. wealth distribution under two different assumptions about inflation
expectations. Xiong and Yan (2010), show that a moderate amount of heterogeneous expec-
tations about inflation can quantitatively explain bond yield volatilities, the failure of the
expectations hypothesis, and the Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005) forward factor predictabil-
ity. Piazzesi and Schneider (2012), using an overlapping generations model with uninsurable
nominal risk and disagreement about inflation, study the impact on wealth distributions
due to structural shifts in the U.S. economy in the 1970s. Buraschi and Whelan (2013)
and Whelan (2014) use survey data about various macroeconomic quantities to study the
effects of disagreement on yield curve properties. Hong, Sraer, and Yu (2014) study how
disagreement about expected inflation interacted with short-sale constraints can impact the
pricing of long maturity bonds. Giacoletti, Laursen, and Singleton (2015) studies the impact
of yield disagreement in a dynamic arbitrage free term structure model. Our paper differs
from all of these works as we derive novel theoretical predictions that we empirically test on
quantities including real and nominal yield levels and their volatilities, the cross-sectional
consumption growth volatility, the break-even inflation rate, and the inflation risk premium.
Another aspect of our work that differs from the literature is that we calibrate our model to
disagreement data.
3Our solution method relies on a binomial expansion similar to the approach in Yan (2008), Dumas,
Kurshev, and Uppal (2009), and Bhamra and Uppal (2014). Alternatively, the model can be solved by the
generalized transform analysis proposed in Chen and Joslin (2012).
4Many of these works grew out of the literature studying the equilibrium impact of heterogeneous beliefs.
Earlier works include Harris and Raviv (1993), Detemple and Murthy (1994), Zapatero (1998), and Basak
(2000). See Basak (2005) for a survey. Other papers that empirically explore the role of inflation beliefs on
the term structure include Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007), Adrian and Wu (2010), Chun (2011), and Chernov
and Mueller (2012).
By putting more structure on our model, we ask if it quantitatively matches our empirical
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 11 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1532
I Theoretical Results
This section provides a general framework to study the impact of inflation disagreement on
real and nominal yield curves, yield volatilities, cross-sectional consumption growth volatility,
break-even inflation, and the inflation risk premium.
Our model is a pure exchange economy with a single perishable consumption good. The
time horizon T ′ of the economy can be finite or infinite. Real prices are measured in units of
the consumption good and nominal prices are quoted in dollars. Let Ct denote the exogenous
real aggregate consumption process and Πt the exogenous price process that converts real
prices into nominal prices, that is, nominal consumption is ΠtCt. The sample space Ω and
the information set Ft on which we define all random variables and probability measures, in
short beliefs, represent the uncertainty in the economy.
Two investors share a common subjective discount factor ρ, a Bernoulli utility function
u(C) = 1
1−γC
1−γ with γ > 0, and an exogenous habit process or, more generally, a preference
shock Ht. Let P
i denote investor i’s belief about inflation Πt, consumption Ct, and the
preference shock Ht. The investors have the same information set Ft and agree on the events
of Ft that cannot occur. Hence, there is no asymmetric information and the likelihood ratio
defined as λt ≡ dP2dP1 is strictly positive and finite.
Both investors trade a complete set of Arrow-Debreu (AD) securities. Let ξit denote the
state price density that represents the AD pricing functional under the probability measure
Pi. Each investor chooses a consumption process C it to maximize
Ei
[
T ′∑
t=0
e−ρtu
(
Cit
Ht
)]
s.t. Ei
[
T ′∑
t=0
ξitC
i
t dt
]
≤ wi0, (1)
where Ei denotes the expectation under the probability measure Pi and wi0 denotes initial
wealth of investor i.5 If time is continuous, then replace the sums in equation (1) with
integrals.
We focus on inflation disagreement and thus make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Inflation Disagreement). There is no disagreement about the distribution
of consumption and the preference shock.
5Investors are either endowed with shares of a claim on aggregate consumption or with a fraction of the
aggregate consumption process.
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sities ξ1t and ξ
2
t in the next proposition. The likelihood ratio λt summarizes the impact of
disagreement on consumption allocations and state prices.
Proposition 1 (Consumption Allocations and State Price Densities). Optimal consumption
allocations are C1t = f(λt)Ct and C
2
t = (1− f(λt))Ct with
f(λt) =
1
1 + (yλt)
1
γ
, (2)
where y = y
2
y1
and yi is the constant Lagrange multiplier from the static budget constraint
given in equation (1). State price densities are
ξ1t = (y
1)−1e−ρtC−γt H
γ−1
t f(λt)
−γ, ξ2t = (y
2)−1e−ρtC−γt H
γ−1
t (1− f(λt))−γ . (3)
Edgeworth Box Example: The left plot of Figure 2 presents an Edgeworth box example
with two dates 0 and 1. For simplicity, we set the subjective discount factor to zero and
normalize aggregate consumption and the habit or preference shock to one. The price level
today is normalized to one and the price level tomorrow is either Πu or Πd. There are
two investors with different beliefs Pi = (pi, 1 − pi). The likelihood ratio λ equals p2
p1
with
probability p1 and 1−p
2
1−p1 with probability 1− p1. The disagreement parameter is Δ = p
2−p1
p1
.6
Since there is no uncertainty about consumption, full insurance is Pareto efficient if
there is no disagreement about inflation (λu = λd = 1). Hence, each investor consumes
the same share of consumption in the high and low inflation state in equilibrium. Suppose
investors are endowed with 0.5 units of the date zero consumption good in both states.
Then, the initial endowment is an equilibrium if there is no disagreement (tangency point
of blue indifference curves). This is no longer true when investors disagree about inflation.
For instance, if the first investor thinks that the low inflation state is more likely, then she
consumes a larger fraction of consumption in this state because λu > λd and thus fu < fd.
Therefore, full insurance is no longer an equilibrium and disagreement affects state prices.
The tangency point of the red indifference curves in the left plot of Figure 2 denotes the
equilibrium consumption allocation for this case.
Throughout this section, we consider two additional examples where consumption and
the habit is normalized to one to illustrate our results. All three examples allow us to focus
on how inflation disagreement impacts real and nominal bonds because ξ1t = ξ
2
t = 1 if there
is no disagreement.
6We divide by p1 to make the disagreement parameter comparable across examples.
We determine the equilibrium consumption allocations C1t and C
2
t and state price den-
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Figure 2: Edgeworth Box and Real Yields
The left plot shows an Edgeworth box example when both investors are endowed with 0.5
units of the date zero consumption good in both states and γ = 2. The red dashed in-
difference curves are tangent at the equilibrium allocation with disagreement and the blue
solid indifference curves are tangent at the equilibrium allocation without disagreement. Full
insurance is no longer an equilibrium when there is disagreement. The right plot shows real
one-year yields as a function of γ. When there is no disagreement, then the real yield is
zero (blue solid line). With disagreement, real yields are nonnegative if γ ≥ 1 and negative
otherwise.
Geometric Brownian Motion Example: Consider a continuous-time economy in which
the price level Πt follows a geometric Brownian motion and two investors disagree on the
expected inflation rate. The dynamics of the price level are
dΠt = x
iΠt dt+ σΠΠt dz
i
t, (4)
where xi denotes the expected inflation rate and zit denotes the perceived nominal shock of
investor i. The dynamics of the likelihood ratio λt are
dλt = Δλt dz
1
t , Δ =
x2 − x1
σΠ
. (5)
Poisson Example: Consider a continuous-time economy in which the dynamics of the price
level are
dΠt = xΠt− dt+ θΠt−dN it−, (6)
where x denotes a constant and θ denotes the constant jump size with θ = 0 and θ > −1.
The two investors agree on the jump times of the Poisson process but disagree on the jump
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the likelihood ratio λt are
dλt = Δλt−
(
dN1t− − l1dt
)
, Δ =
l2 − l1
l1
. (7)
We conclude this subsection by specifying the baseline parameters for all three examples.
Edgeworth box example: p1 = 0.4, p2 = 0.6,Πu = 1.25, and Πd = 0.9. The GBM example,
where (log) inflation rates are normally distributed with constant mean and volatility, focuses
on the effects of disagreement about expected inflation on consumption allocations and
asset prices. The baseline parameters for this example are σΠ = 2%, x
1 = 1.5%, and
x2 = 2.5%. The Poisson example illustrates how disagreement about expected inflation
and higher order moments of inflation affect consumption allocations and asset prices. The
baseline parameters are x = 6%, θ = −10%, l1 = 12.5%, and l2 = 27.5%.
A Real Yields and Cross-Sectional Consumption Volatility
A real bond is a default-free zero-coupon bond that pays one unit of the consumption good
at its maturity. All real bonds are in zero-net supply and can be priced using a state price
density from Proposition 1. Let Bt,T denote the real price of a real bond maturing at T with
continuously-compounded real yield yBt,T = − 1T−t log (Bt,T ), where T ∈ [t, T ′]. The real price
of a real bond is
Bt,T = E
i
t
[
ξiT
ξit
]
. (8)
The cross-sectional consumption growth variance from time t to T is
σ2CS(λt, λT ) ≡
1
4
(
log
(
C1T
C1t
)
− log
(
C2T
C2t
))2
=
1
4γ2
(
log
(
λT
λt
))2
. (9)
There are no fluctuations in the cross-sectional consumption distribution when there is no
disagreement (λT = λt = 1). Moreover, there is less variation in cross-sectional consumption
allocations if investors are more risk averse because they trade less aggressively on their
beliefs. Trading on beliefs also leads to more volatile real yields. We formally show this in
the next theorem, where we also discuss how disagreement affects the level of real yields.
Theorem 1. If Assumption 1 is satisfied, then
(i) real yields and their volatilities do not depend on disagreement if γ = 1,
intensity li. Hence, they disagree on the expected inflation rate x + θli. The dynamics of
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(ii) real yields are higher with than without disagreement if γ > 1 (the opposite is true if
γ < 1),
(iii) the cross-sectional consumption growth volatility is higher with than without disagree-
ment, and
(iv) the volatility of real yields is higher with than without disagreement if γ = 1 and λt is
independent of Ct and Ht.
Why are real yields higher with disagreement if γ > 1 and lower if γ < 1? Intuitively,
investors make different consumption and savings decisions based on their differing views
about inflation. Both investors think they will capture consumption from the other investor
in the future; hence, classical income and substitution effects then impact the demand for
consumption today. If γ > 1, then the real interest rate rises to counterbalance increased
demand for borrowing. If γ < 1, then the real interest rate falls to counterbalance lowered
demand for borrowing.7 There is no effect on real yields if the income and substitution
effects exactly offset (γ = 1), as in Xiong and Yan (2010).
We determine bond prices in all three examples in closed form.8 The right plot of Figure
2 shows real one-year yields as a function of γ. When there is no disagreement, then the real
yield is zero (blue solid line). With disagreement, real yields are nonnegative if γ ≥ 1 and
negative otherwise. The red dashed, green dash-dotted, and solid black circle lines represent
the baseline for the Edgeworth box, GBM, and Poisson examples. The black dashed circle
line shows that real yields with lower jump intensities (l1 = 5% and l2 = 20%) and the
black dash-dotted circle line shows real yields with higher jump intensities (l1 = 20% and
l2 = 35%) than in the baseline case. The three Poisson examples show that real yields are
increasing in Δ = l
2−l1
l1
if γ > 1 and decreasing if γ < 1.
In the remainder of this subsection, we generalize the results of Theorem 1 by defining a
measure of disagreement to study the effects of changes in disagreement on real yield levels
and the cross-sectional consumption growth volatility. Measuring disagreement is straightfor-
ward in all three examples because investors’ beliefs belong to the same class of distributions
and there is only disagreement about a single parameter. To measure disagreement among
investors more generally, we define disagreement as relative entropy per year.9 This measure
7For details see Epstein (1988) or Gallmeyer and Hollifield (2008).
8We provide details in the Internet Appendix.
9The relative entropy or Kullback-Leibler divergence is widely used in statistics or information theory
to measure the difference between two probability distributions (see Kullback (1959)). While this measure
is not symmetric, the results do not change if we compute the relative entropy with respect to the second
investor. Similarly, all our results still follow if we consider other divergence measures suggested in the
literature (see Csisza´r and Shields (2004)).
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Figure 3: Disagreement Measure and Real Yields
The left plot shows the disagreement parameter Δ in all three examples as an increasing
function of the inflation disagreement measure D0,1. The right plot shows that real yields
are increasing in inflation disagreement D0,1 when γ = 7.
allows us to study the effects of disagreement on bond yields when investors have beliefs that
differ by more than one parameter or do not even belong to the same class of distributions.
Definition 1 (Inflation Disagreement Measure). Consider a belief structure Bt,T = (P1,P2)
with the likelihood ratio λu =
dP2
dP1
|Fu for all t ≤ u ≤ T . Define disagreement as
Dt,T = − 1
T − tE
1
t
[
log
(
λT
λt
)]
. (10)
Disagreement Dt,T is nonnegative. It is zero if and only if the two investors have the same
belief, in which case λt = λT = 1. The left plot of Figure 3 shows the disagreement parameter
Δ for all three examples as a function of D0,1. The red dashed line represents the Edgeworth
box example with Δ = p
2−p1
p1
, the green dash-dotted line represents the Brownian example
with Δ = x
2−x1
σΠ
, and the black solid line represents the Poisson example with Δ = l
2−l1
l1
. The
plot shows that D0,1 strictly increases in the Δ’s of all three examples and that it is zero if
and only if Δ = 0.
Consider the economies E = (Bt,T , f(λt)) and Eη =
(
Bηtη ,Tη , f(ηtη)
)
populated by two
investors with different beliefs, who share consumption according to the rule f(λt) and
f(ηtη), respectively. We use different time subscripts to emphasize that the analysis below
also allows for comparisons over time. Suppose there is more disagreement in economy Eη
than in economy E , that is, Dηtη ,Tη ≥ Dt,T . To compare consumption allocations and bond
prices in the two economies, we make the following assumption about the likelihood ratios
λt and ηtη .
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Assumption 2 (Likelihood Ratio Decomposition). Suppose the likelihood ratios ηu and λu
are independent of Cu and Hu. Moreover, the distribution of
ηTη
ηtη
conditional on Ftη equals
the distribution of λT
λt
ε conditional on Ft, where ε denotes a strictly positive random variable
with Eε [ε | λT ] = Eε [ε] = 1 for all λT .
While this assumption rules out disagreement about the correlation between consump-
tion and inflation, it does not imply that inflation is independent of consumption and the
habit. Moreover, it allows us to focus on one-dimensional decompositions of the conditional
distribution of
ηTη
ηtη
. The multiplicative decomposition of the conditional distribution of
ηTη
ηtη
nevertheless covers a large class of stochastic processes.10 For instance, all three examples
satisfy Assumption 2 if Δη ≥ Δ. Intuitively, one can think of ηTη as a noisy version of λT .
We summarize the results in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 (Disagreement). Suppose the likelihood ratios ηt and λt satisfy Assumptions
1 and 2. Then, the belief structure Bηtη ,Tη exhibits more disagreement than the belief structure
Bt,T , that is, Dηtη ,Tη ≥ Dt,T .
We show in the next theorem that all results of Theorem 1, except for the yield volatility
result, generalize when we compare economies with differing levels of disagreement (holding
everything else fixed).
Theorem 2. Consider two economies E = (Bt,T , f(λt)) and Eη =
(
Bηtη ,Tη , f(ηtη)
)
with
• the same time horizon, that is, τ = Tη − tη = T − t,
• the same current consumption allocations, that is, ft = f(λt) = f(ηtη), and
• the same distribution of real quantities, that is, the joint distribution of CTη
Ctη
and
HTη
Htη
conditional on Ftη is equal to the joint distribution of CTCt and HTHt conditional on Ft.
Suppose there is more disagreement in economy Eη than in economy E, that is, Dηtη ,tη+τ ≥
Dt,t+τ , and adopt Assumptions 1 and 2. Then,
10All results still follow if we consider additive mean independent and comonotone decompositions of the
conditional distribution of
ηTη
ηtη
.
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(ii) real yields are higher in economy Eη than in economy E if γ > 1 (the opposite is true
if γ < 1), and
(iii) the expected cross-sectional consumption growth volatility is higher in economy Eη than
in economy E if λT
λt
and ε are independent.
The right plot of Figure 3 shows real yields and the left plot of Figure 4 shows the
expected cross-sectional consumption growth volatility as an increasing function of disagree-
ment D0,1 for all three examples when γ = 7. The right plot of Figure 4 shows the volatility
of real one year yields as a function of disagreement. The black star and black diamond lines
represent the Poisson example with γ = 2 and γ = 0.5, respectively. The green dash-dotted
star and the green dash-dotted diamond lines represent the GBM example with γ = 2 and
γ = 0.5, respectively. Real yield volatility in the GBM and Poisson example is higher for
γ = 0.5 than for γ = 2 since the expected cross-sectional consumption growth volatility is
decreasing with risk aversion. The plots show that real yield volatility is also increasing in
disagreement.
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Figure 4: Volatility of Consumption and Real Yields
The expected cross-sectional consumption growth volatility and the volatility of real yields
are strictly increasing in inflation disagreement D0,1. The expected cross-sectional consump-
tion growth volatility is decreasing in risk aversion and thus real yield volatility is lower with
γ = 2 than with γ = 0.5.
B Nominal Yields
A nominal bond is a default-free zero-coupon bond that pays one dollar at its maturity.
All nominal bonds are in zero-net supply and are priced using the state price densities
(i) real yields are the same in both economies if γ = 1,
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from Proposition 1. Let Pt,T denote the nominal price of a nominal bond maturing at T
with continuously-compounded nominal yield yPt,T = − 1T−t log (Pt,T ), where T ∈ [t, T ′]. The
nominal price of a nominal bond is
Pt,T = E
i
t
[
ξiT
ξit
Πt
ΠT
]
. (11)
Let RXt,T denote the real gross return on a T -year nominal bond in excess of the real gross
return on a T -year real bond:
RXt,T =
(
PT,T
ΠT
/
Pt,T
Πt
)/
BT,T
Bt,T
= e(y
P
t,T−yBt,T )(T−t) Πt
ΠT
. (12)
The nominal return on a nominal bond is certain, while the real return on a nominal bond
is a bet on inflation risk, that is, a bet on the real value of one dollar which is 1
ΠT
. The
inflation risk premium perceived by investor i is defined as the expected real excess return
on a T -year nominal bond:
Eit [RXt,T ] = e
(yPt,T−yBt,T )(T−t)Eit
[
Πt
ΠT
]
, i = 0, 1, 2, (13)
where P0 denotes the belief of a representative investor when there is no disagreement.
Let IRPit,T denote the annualized log inflation risk premium and EINFL
i
t,T the annualized
expected log inflation rate perceived by investor i:11
EINFLit,T ≡ −
1
T − t log
(
Eit
[
Πt
ΠT
])
, (14)
IRPit,T ≡
1
T − t log
(
Eit [RXt,T ]
)
= yPt,T − yBt,T − EINFLit,T . (15)
Hence, the nominal bond yield is
yPt,T = y
B
t,T + EINFL
i
t,T + IRP
i
t,T , i = 0, 1, 2. (16)
In contrast to real yields, the effect of inflation disagreement on nominal yields is ambigu-
ous without imposing additional assumptions on investors’ inflation beliefs. For example,
11Jensen inequality implies that
EINFLt,T = − 1
T − t log
(
Et
[
Πt
ΠT
])
≤ 1
T − tEt
[
log
(
ΠT
Πt
)]
≤ 1
T − t log
(
Et
[
ΠT
Πt
])
,
and thus IRPt,T is higher than the inflation risk premium implied by other measures for expected inflation.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 20 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1532
consider the case where investors agree on a very high expected inflation rate to the case
where investors have high disagreement about a very low expected inflation rate. Real yields
are elevated with high disagreement if γ > 1, but a high enough expected inflation rate
may cause nominal yields to be even higher although there is no disagreement. Similarly,
agreement on a very high inflation risk premium may lead to nominal yields that are higher
than when there is high disagreement about a low inflation risk premium.
To avoid this problem, we need to hold expected inflation and the inflation risk premium
constant when studying the effects of inflation disagreement on nominal yields. However,
it is not clear which belief to hold constant when increasing inflation disagreement in a
heterogeneous beliefs economy. We could consider a mean preserving spread on inflation ex-
pectations and inflation risk premiums while keeping the average belief about them constant
to unambiguously increase disagreement. However, this does not take into account that the
belief of a wealthier investor has a stronger impact on nominal yields than the belief of a
poorer investor. Hence, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3 (Belief Restriction). The beliefs P1 and P2 satisfy
E0t
[
Πt
ΠT
]
= f(λt)E
1
t
[
Πt
ΠT
]
+ (1− f(λt))E2t
[
Πt
ΠT
]
, (17)
Cov0t
[
Πt
ΠT
,
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
= f(λt)Cov
1
t
[
Πt
ΠT
,
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
+ (1− f(λt))Cov2t
[
Πt
ΠT
,
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
, (18)
where P0 denotes the belief and ξ0t = e
−ρtC−γt H
γ−1
t is the state price density when there is
no disagreement.
Equation (17) requires that the weighted average across each investor’s expected real
value of a dollar is fixed when disagreement about inflation changes. The weights are given
by the fraction of output that each investors consumes ((f(λt), 1 − f(λt)) as the wealthier
investor’s belief impacts the nominal bond price the most. It is not only the belief about
expected inflation that impacts the nominal bond yield, but also the inflation risk premium
that investors require when betting on the real value of a dollar. So, we impose an additional
restriction given by equation (18). This restriction requires that the weighted average across
each investor’s inflation risk premium belief is fixed when inflation disagreement changes. If
there is only disagreement about expected inflation, then equation (18) is trivially satisfied.
However, we also allow for disagreement about higher order moments of inflation and the
joint distribution of inflation and real quantities. Thus, the beliefs P1 and P2 about the
covariances in equation (18) do not have to be the same. We show in the next theorem
that, in this case, disagreement has qualitatively the same effect on nominal yields as on real
yields.
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Theorem 3 (Nominal Yield). If Assumptions 1 and 3 are satisfied, then
(i) nominal yields do not depend on disagreement if γ = 1 and
(ii) nominal yields are higher with than without disagreement if γ > 1 (the opposite is true
if γ < 1).
The left plot of Figure 5 shows nominal one-year yields as a function of risk aversion
γ. The red dashed circle, green dash-dotted circle, and black circle lines represent the
Edgeworth box, GBM, and Poisson examples, respectively, when there is no disagreement.
The corresponding lines without circles represent the examples when there is disagreement
and Assumption 3 is satisfied. The plot shows that in all three examples nominal yields are
higher with disagreement than without disagreement if γ > 1 and lower if γ < 1.
We discuss the implications for nominal yields when equation (17) of Assumption 3 is not
satisfied by means of the GBM example. Investors share aggregate consumption equally, that
is, f = 0.5. The expected inflation rate is two percent x¯ = 2%, if there is no disagreement
in which case the nominal yield is 1.96% (green dash-dotted circle line). We consider three
different cases with disagreement: (i) baseline with x1 = 1.5% and x2 = 2.5% (green dash-
dotted line), (ii) x1 = 1% and x2 = 2% (green dash-dotted plus line), and (iii) x1 = 2%
and x2 = 3% (green dash-dotted cross line). The consumption share weighted-average
belief in the first case is approximately 2%, and thus Assumption 3 is satisfied.12 If the
consumption share weighted average belief is below 2%, then inflation disagreement lowers
nominal yields if γ < 1, but does not always increase nominal yields if γ > 1. Intuitively,
inflation disagreement pushes up real yields, but lowers the expected inflation rate. If the
second effect dominates the first, then nominal yields are lower than in the no disagreement
economy. The intuition is similar for the third case.
The right plot of Figure 5 shows that nominal yields in all three examples are strictly
increasing in inflation disagreement D0,1 when γ > 1 and while keeping the consumption-
share weighted expected value of one dollar fixed.13
12In this example, we have that 0.5e−1.5% + 0.5e−2.5% ≈ e−2%.
13Equation (18) is trivially satisfied for all beliefs because ξ0t ≡ 1.
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Figure 5: Nominal Yields and Disagreement
The left plot shows nominal one-year yields as a function of risk aversion. Nominal yields are
higher (lower) with than without disagreement when γ ≥ (≤)1 except for the cases GBM II
and III where Assumption 3 is not satisfied. The right plot shows the nominal one-year yield
as an increasing function of inflation disagreement D0,1 when γ = 7 and the consumption-
share weighted belief of both investors about the expected real value of one Dollar does not
change with disagreement.
C Break-Even Inflation Rate
In this section, we study whether disagreement drives a wedge between real and nominal
yields. Let BEIRt,T denote the break-even inflation rate defined as the difference between
the nominal and real yield of a T−year bond, that is, BEIRt,T = yPt,T − yBt,T .
Proposition 3 (Break-Even Inflation Rate). If Assumptions 1 and 3 are satisfied, then
(i) the break-even inflation rate does not depend on disagreement if γ = 1 and
(ii) the effects of disagreement on the break-even inflation rate are ambiguous if γ = 1.
The left plot of Figure 6 shows the difference between the break-even inflation rate in
an economy with and without disagreement as a function of risk aversion. If γ = 1, the
break-even inflation rate does not depend on disagreement. Thus, the red dashed lines
(Edgeworth Box example), the green dash-dotted lines (GBM example), and the black lines
(Poisson example) all intersect at zero. If γ > 1, then the break-even inflation rate is
higher with disagreement than without disagreement in the GBM and Poisson example.
The quantitative effect is smaller for the short end of the yield curve and it is larger in the
Poisson example than the GBM example. In contrast to the real and nominal yield curve,
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Figure 6: Break-Even Inflation and Inflation Risk Premium
The left plot shows the difference between the break-even inflation rate in an economy with
and without disagreement as a function of risk aversion γ. If γ ≥ 1, the break-even inflation
rate is higher with than without disagreement in the GBM, Poisson, and second Edgeworth
box example. The opposite is true in the first Edgeworth box example. The right plot shows
the inflation risk premium when there is a disagreement as a function of perceived expected
inflation of an econometrician. The inflation risk premium is sensitive to the belief of the
econometrician.
the effects of inflation disagreement on the break-even inflation rate are ambiguous. For
instance, consider an Edgeworth box example where risk aversion is greater than one and
the second investor thinks that the high and low inflation state are equally likely. If the
first investor thinks that the high inflation state is less likely (red dashed star line), than
the break-even inflation rate is lower with than without disagreement. The opposite is true
when the first investor thinks that the high inflation state is more likely (red dashed diamond
line).
D Inflation Risk Premium
In contrast to the break-even inflation rate, which is a statement about prices, the inflation
risk premium is sensitive to the belief chosen to determine inflation expectations. Specifically,
let Pˆ denote the belief of an econometrician. Then the nominal yield can be decomposed
into:
yPt,T = y
B
t,T + ÊINFLt,T + ÎRPt,T = y
B
t,T + EINFL
i
t,T + IRP
i
t,T , ∀ i = 0, 1, 2. (19)
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Investors and econometricians agree on prices, so they agree on the break-even inflation
rate BEIRt,T = y
P
t,T − yBt,T . However, they may have different beliefs about inflation. If
they disagree about expected inflation, then by equation (19) they have to disagree on the
inflation risk premium. For example, consider the case when the first investor predicts lower
inflation than the second investor, that is, EINFL1t,T < EINFL
2
t,T . Subtracting the expected
inflation rate from the agreed upon break-even inflation rate leads to a higher perceived
compensation for inflation risk for the first investor, that is, IRP1t,T > IRP
2
t,T .
The right plot of Figure 6 shows the inflation risk premium in an economy with disagree-
ment perceived by an econometrician for different beliefs Pˆ. In all three examples, the first
investor thinks expected inflation is 1% and the second investor thinks expected inflation is
3%, that is, EINFL1t,T = 1% < EINFL
2
t,T = 3%. Both investors consume the same fraction
of consumption today, so the consumption-share weighted average belief about expected
inflation is 2%. When the belief of the econometrician coincides with the consumption-
share weighted average belief, then the inflation risk premium is slightly negative in the
Edgeworth box example because the break-even inflation rate is smaller with than without
disagreement. In the other two examples, the risk premium is positive. The plot of the
inflation risk premium perceived by an econometrician in an economy without disagreement
is very similar. In this case, the inflation risk premium is zero when we impose rational
expectations, that is, if we impose that the belief of the econometrician coincides with the
belief of the representative investor (P0 = Pˆ). If the econometrician underestimates expected
inflation (ÊINFLt,T < EINFL
0
t,T ), then she perceives a positive inflation risk premium.
We characterize the inflation risk premium perceived by both investors in the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. The difference in investors’ perceived inflation risk premiums is independent
of preferences and consumption allocations. Specifically,
IRP2t,T − IRP1t,T = EINFL1t,T − EINFL2t,T = ΔEINFLt,T . (20)
Moreover, we have the following limits
lim
ft→1
IRP1t,T = IRP
H,1
t,T , lim
ft→0
IRP1t,T = IRP
H,2
t,T −ΔEINFLt,T , (21)
lim
ft→0
IRP2t,T = IRP
H,2
t,T , lim
ft→1
IRP2t,T = IRP
H,1
t,T +ΔEINFLt,T , (22)
where IRPH,it,T is the inflation risk premium in an economy populated by investor i only.
While the difference in inflation risk premiums is independent of preferences and con-
sumption shares, the investor who actually perceives the largest (absolute) inflation risk
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premium is not. Consider the case when investor one has a consumption share that is close
to one. Then, bond prices reflect the view of investor one. Therefore, the speculative com-
ponent, as captured by ΔEINFLt,T , is negligible from that investor’s point of view. The
entire speculative component is captured by the second investor. As the consumption shares
become similar across investors, bond prices reflect both views and the perceived inflation
risk premiums for both investors reflect the disagreement in the economy.
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Figure 7: Inflation Risk Premium
The figure shows the real yield (top-left), nominal yield (top-right), break-even inflation
(bottom-left), and inflation risk premium (bottom-right) as an increasing function of inflation
disagreement D0,1 when γ = 2. There are three states with inflation given by (0.9, 1, 1.125)
in state one, two, and three, respectively. The probability as perceived by investor one over
the three states are given by (0.2, 0.4, 0.4). For the second investor, we vary the probability
of the first state from 0.2 to 0.05 and then solve for the probability of the two other states
such that E1
[
1
Π1
]
= E2
[
1
Π1
]
. There is a positive break even inflation rate and inflation risk
premium even though investors agree on the expected real value of one dollar.
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The perceived inflation risk premiums are not bounded between the risk premiums in the
homogeneous investor economies; that is, min
{
IRP1t,T , IRP
2
t,T
} ≤ min{IRPH,1t,T , IRPH,2t,T } or
max
{
IRP1t,T , IRP
2
t,T
} ≥ max{IRPH,1t,T , IRPH,2t,T } can occur. The next example shows that
investors can disagree about the distribution of inflation, but agree on the inflation risk
premium. Consider a two date economy with two investors and three states, where the time
discount factor is zero and aggregate consumption and habit are normalized to one. We
choose probabilities perceived by the investors in such a way that they agree on expected
inflation, EINFL1t,T = EINFL
2
t,T , but disagree about the distribution of inflation. In this
case, the nominal yield in a homogeneous investor economy with beliefs given by investor
one would be equal to that of a homogeneous investor economy with beliefs given by investor
two and the inflation risk premium would be zero under both beliefs. However, once both
investors are present in the same economy and γ = 1, then the inflation risk premium is
non-zero due to changes in the investment opportunity set caused by speculative trade.
Figure 7 shows the real and nominal yields, the break-even inflation, and the inflation risk
premium as a function of disagreement. Both real and nominal yields are increasing in
disagreement as predicted by Theorems 2 and 3. In addition, both investors agree on the
inflation risk premium. Yet, the inflation risk premium differs from that of a homogeneous
investor economy. Here, disagreement about the distribution of inflation creates a positive
inflation risk premium that increases in disagreement.
II Empirical Evidence
To validate the theory, we use the Survey of Professional Forecasters (abbreviated as SPF)
and the Michigan Surveys of Consumers (abbreviated as MSC) to empirically test whether
inflation disagreement affects (i) real yields (Table 3), (ii) nominal yields (Table 4), (iii)
real and nominal yield volatilities (Table 5), (iv) break-even inflation and the inflation risk
premium (Table 6), and (v) cross-sectional consumption growth volatility and trading on
inflation disagreement (Table 7). The surveys differ with respect to the sophistication of the
constituency, the size of the survey, and the data frequency. Thus, they provide independent
evidence for inflation disagreement.
A Data
Inflation Disagreement. Disagreement about inflation, our main explanatory variable,
is the cross-sectional standard deviation of one year ahead inflation forecasts abbreviated
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as DisInf. Disagreement of consumers is directly taken from the MSC database and dis-
agreement of professionals is computed from the raw series of the SPF forecasts. The MSC
inflation forecasts, conducted at a monthly frequency, are available since January 1978 while
the SPF inflation forecasts, conducted at a quarterly frequency, are available since September
1981.14
Yields. The U.S. Treasury only began issuing TIPS in 1997, so we merge the implied
real yields in Chernov and Mueller (2012), which are available at quarterly frequency from
Q3-1971 to Q4-2002, with real yields on Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) to
build a longer time series of real bond yields. The available real yield maturities are 2, 3, 5,
7, and 10 years.15 Monthly nominal Fama-Bliss discount bond yields are from CRSP.16 The
Fama-Bliss discount bond file contains yields with 1 to 5 year maturities with data going
back to 1952. Lastly, from the real and the nominal yield series, we compute the time-series
of real and nominal yield volatilities by estimating a GARCH(1, 1) model with an AR(1)
mean equation. We use all available data in the GARCH estimation.
Cross-Sectional Consumption. We calculate monthly cross-sectional consumption
growth volatility, starting from April 1984, from consumption growth rates of consumers us-
ing data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.17
For further information regarding the CEX data and how to construct consumption growth
rates of households from the raw data see Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2009)
and the references therein.
Trading on Inflation Disagreement. We construct three measures for trading on
inflation disagreement. First, we use the volatility of total treasury volume scaled by out-
standing treasuries.18 The trading volume data and the outstanding amount of treasuries
are available from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association (SIFMA) at a
monthly frequency since January 2001.19 To measure the volatility of trading in Treasuries,
we estimate a GARCH(1, 1) model with a constant mean term. Second, we use the open
14See www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data for a detailed description of the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters, which is conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. The website
www.sca.isr.umich.edu/ contains detailed information regarding the Michigan Surveys of Consumers.
15The real yield data are available at personal.lse.ac.uk/muellerp/RealYieldAOT5.xls. The TIPS data
are available from www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata/feds200628.xls. For the 5, 7, and 10
maturities, we use TIPS data from 2003 onwards. The 4 year yield is not available in Chernov and Mueller
(2012). For 2 and 3 year maturities, we interpolate the rates for 2003 with cubic splines.
16The Fama-Bliss discount bond file is available from wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds.
17We thank Jing Yu for advising us on the use of the CEX data including computing the cross-sectional
consumption growth volatility.
18We follow Grossman and Zhou (1996) and Longstaff and Wang (2013) to capture the intensity of trading
by using the volatility of turnover because turnover is not defined in a frictionless economy.
19The data are from SIFMA’s website at this link: www.sifma.org.
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interest in interest rate futures and scale it by the open interest in all financial futures to
account for increased security trade over time. The open interest data for interest rate and
financial futures are from the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) at a
monthly frequency since April 1986.20 Third, we use de-trended log inflation swap notionals
available at the monthly frequency since December 2005.21 The monthly notional amounts
correspond to averages of daily brokered inflation swap activity.
Inflation. We obtain quarterly and monthly CPI data from the FRED Economic Data
base to compute inflation rates as logarithmic changes starting in January 1947. We estimate
a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation using the whole sample, to obtain
a time series of monthly and quarterly expected inflation and inflation volatility forecasts
over multiple horizons.
Summary Statistics. We conclude this subsection with summary statistics of all vari-
ables in Tables 1 and 2. All data series end in June of 2014 or Q2-2014 except the CEX
data (consumption is available until December 2012 and income until March 2012), Treasury
volume (available until August 2013), open interest data (available until December 2013),
and the inflation swap notionals (available until February 2012).
B Real Yield Levels
Empirically, we show that an increase in inflation disagreement raises real yields at all
maturities. Table 3 shows the slope coefficients, t-statistics, the R2’s, and the number of
observations (N) for a univariate and a multivariate regression model. For each maturity, we
regress real yields on disagreement about inflation (DisInf) based on SPF (columns 2 to 6)
and MSC (columns 7 to 11). To facilitate a comparison between SPF and MSC, we use the
sample period Q3-1981 to Q2-2014 and standardize the regression coefficients in all tables.22
Regression model 2 controls for expected inflation (ExpInf) and inflation volatility (SigInf)
because both variables are correlated with disagreement and may effect real yields. The
forecast horizons for ExpInf and SigInf correspond to yield maturities. We use Newey-West
corrected t-statistics with 12 lags in all regressions to correct for serial correlation in error
terms.
20CFTC data are available from www.cftc.gov.
21See Fleming and Sporn (2013) for a description of the data. We thank Michael Fleming for sharing the
aggregated inflation swap notional data with us.
22Using the same sample period on the quarterly data excludes the high inflation period Q1-1978 to
Q2-1981 from the analysis.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Real and Nominal Yields and their Volatilities. The table reports mean, median,
standard deviation (Std), and number of observations (N) of percentage real and nominal yields and real and nominal yield
volatilities. Quarterly real yields are from Chernov and Mueller (2012) merged with TIPS yields from Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and
Wright (2010). Nominal yields at monthly and quarterly frequency are from Fama-Bliss. Yield volatilities are computed by
estimating a GARCH(1, 1) model with an AR(1) mean equation. Real yield sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014. Nominal yield
sample: January 1978 to June 2014.
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
Quarterly Real Yields Quarterly Nominal Yields Monthly Nominal Yields
Mean 1.927 2.027 2.255 2.415 2.586 4.851 5.160 5.421 5.647 5.809 5.412 5.672 5.884 6.080 6.220
Median 2.370 2.395 2.430 2.533 2.628 5.012 5.080 5.332 5.615 5.585 5.370 5.560 5.788 5.922 5.972
STD 1.976 1.836 1.594 1.433 1.247 3.390 3.424 3.380 3.311 3.219 3.690 3.631 3.528 3.432 3.328
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
Quarterly Real Yield Volatilities Quarterly Nominal Yield Volatilities Monthly Nominal Yield Volatilities
Mean 0.733 0.620 0.511 0.452 0.389 0.319 0.352 0.357 0.368 0.357 0.374 0.388 0.386 0.388 0.371
Median 0.639 0.555 0.468 0.423 0.368 0.258 0.313 0.335 0.339 0.329 0.278 0.322 0.340 0.342 0.326
STD 0.298 0.212 0.134 0.096 0.070 0.256 0.196 0.154 0.152 0.140 0.352 0.263 0.216 0.188 0.167
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the Mean, Volatility, and Disagreement of Inflation, CEX and Trading Data.
The table reports mean, median, standard deviation (Std), and number of observations (N) of monthly and quarterly expected
inflation, monthly and quarterly inflation volatility, MSC and SPF based measures of inflation disagreements (DisInf), CEX
cross-sectional consumption growth volatility (Cons Vol) and income growth volatility (Income Vol), volatility of treasury volume
(Vol Volume), open interest ratio in interest rate futures (Open Interest Ratio), and the notionals of inflation swaps (Inf Swaps).
The reported statistics of one year forecasts of expected inflation (ExpInf) and inflation volatility (SigInf) are estimated using
a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation.
Forecast
Horizon 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 7y 10y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
Quarterly Expected Inflation Monthly Expected Inflation
Mean 3.106 3.192 3.259 3.313 3.355 3.417 3.475 3.628 3.603 3.584 3.568 3.555
Median 3.100 3.186 3.254 3.308 3.351 3.414 3.473 3.197 3.239 3.272 3.299 3.320
STD 1.133 0.948 0.803 0.688 0.597 0.464 0.339 2.047 1.730 1.479 1.277 1.115
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
Quarterly Inflation Volatility Monthly Inflation Volatility
Mean 1.746 1.483 1.359 1.286 1.237 1.175 1.124 0.973 0.722 0.608 0.538 0.489
Median 1.446 1.271 1.191 1.145 1.115 1.079 1.050 0.874 0.661 0.565 0.505 0.463
STD 0.942 0.668 0.533 0.450 0.392 0.316 0.249 0.363 0.217 0.153 0.115 0.091
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
Quarterly Monthly
CEX CEX Open
DisInf DisInf DisInf Cons Income Vol Interest Inf
SPF MSC MSC Vol Vol Volume Ratio Swaps
Mean 0.660 5.192 5.537 0.367 0.898 0.036 0.688 0.000
Median 0.564 4.900 5.200 0.366 0.902 0.023 0.712 0.020
STD 0.339 1.584 1.947 0.022 0.178 0.023 0.103 0.496
N 132 132 438 345 330 152 333 70
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Table 3: Inflation Disagreement and Real Yields. The table reports results from
OLS regressions of real yields on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation
(ExpInf), and the volatility of inflation (SigInf). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West
corrected with 12 lags. Regression coefficients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are pre-
dicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation over multiple horizons
(T). Sample: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.407 0.397 0.388 0.382 0.376 0.560 0.575 0.583 0.589 0.595
t-stat 3.48 3.33 3.23 3.18 3.12 3.04 3.18 3.29 3.39 3.50
adj. R2 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.31 0.33 0.33 0.34 0.35
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
DisInf 0.290 0.285 0.281 0.280 0.280 0.452 0.472 0.487 0.501 0.515
t-stat 2.27 2.20 2.12 2.12 2.12 2.55 2.75 3.00 3.17 3.34
ExpInf 0.350 0.359 0.358 0.352 0.344 0.251 0.246 0.236 0.221 0.206
t-stat 2.19 2.17 2.03 1.95 1.88 1.98 1.98 1.87 1.77 1.64
SigInf 0.099 0.080 0.068 0.057 0.042 0.106 0.077 0.056 0.038 0.018
t-stat 0.71 0.57 0.48 0.39 0.29 1.04 0.80 0.62 0.43 0.20
adj. R2 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.37
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
The top panel of Table 3 shows the univariate regression results. The coefficient estimates
for disagreement are positive and statistically significant, at least at the 5% level, for SPF
and MSC at all maturities. Inflation disagreement is economically significant for SPF and
MSC. Specifically, an increase in disagreement by one standard deviation of SPF (0.339%)
and MSC (1.584%) raises the two year real yield by 40.7% and 56.0% of its standard deviation
(1.976%). The results are similar for other maturities.
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows that the coefficient estimates for disagreement re-
main positive and statistically significant when we control for the mean and volatility of
inflation. Expected inflation is positive and statistically significant for short maturities. For
longer maturities, the coefficients become insignificant for MSC. Inflation volatility produces
statistically insignificant coefficient estimates in all regressions.
C Nominal Yield Levels
Inflation disagreement also raises nominal yields at all maturities in the data. Table 4 shows
regression results of nominal yields on inflation disagreement based on SPF (columns 2 to 6)
and MSC (columns 7 to 11). Regression model 1 contains expected inflation as an additional
explanatory variable because it affects nominal yields and is correlated with disagreement. To
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alleviate concerns that inflation disagreement measures uncertainty about inflation instead
of disagreement, regression model 2 also includes the volatility of inflation (SigInf). Nominal
yields are available at the monthly frequency and, thus, we use monthly data starting in
January 1978 for MSC. This increases the sample size from 132 to 438.
Table 4: Inflation Disagreement and Nominal Yields. The table reports results from
OLS regressions of nominal yields on disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected infla-
tion (ExpInf), and the volatility of inflation (SigInf). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West
corrected with 12 lags. Regression coefficients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are pre-
dicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation over multiple horizons
(T). Samples: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014 and January 1978 to June 2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.354 0.356 0.363 0.364 0.377 0.470 0.513 0.548 0.571 0.594
t-stat 3.63 3.60 3.65 3.74 3.88 4.11 4.39 4.61 4.80 5.05
ExpInf 0.459 0.449 0.437 0.435 0.424 0.356 0.298 0.249 0.219 0.196
t-stat 4.36 4.37 4.26 4.26 4.19 3.49 2.73 2.16 1.81 1.62
adj. R2 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.55
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
DisInf 0.364 0.374 0.381 0.384 0.397 0.488 0.542 0.582 0.613 0.636
t-stat 3.51 3.50 3.51 3.58 3.63 4.16 4.55 4.86 5.17 5.42
ExpInf 0.448 0.430 0.416 0.411 0.399 0.334 0.264 0.207 0.169 0.144
t-stat 3.21 3.07 2.94 2.89 2.83 3.15 2.41 1.84 1.46 1.24
SigInf -0.024 -0.041 -0.044 -0.049 -0.050 -0.061 -0.091 -0.107 -0.126 -0.126
t-stat -0.24 -0.40 -0.42 -0.46 -0.47 -0.86 -1.31 -1.55 -1.88 -1.97
adj. R2 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.39 0.58 0.57 0.56 0.56 0.56
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
Like the real yield results, the coefficients for disagreement are positive as well as eco-
nomically and statistically significant for SPF and MSC at all maturities, as shown in the top
panel of Table 4. An increase in disagreement by one standard deviation of SPF (0.339%)
and MSC (1.947%) raises the one year nominal yield by 35.4% and 47.0% of its standard
deviation (3.390% and 3.690%, respectively). The economic significance of inflation disagree-
ment is large and comparable to the one of expected inflation, which is 45.9% and 35.6%,
respectively. The results are similar for other maturities. The bottom panel of Table 4 shows
that the coefficient estimates for disagreement remain positive and statistically significant
when we control for the mean and volatility of inflation. All coefficient estimates for inflation
volatility are negative and insignificant, except for maturities 4 and 5 in the MSC regression
which are negative and significant at the 5% level.
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We conclude this section by mentioning an alternative interpretation for the nominal
regression results. Subtracting a measure of expected inflation from nominal yields has been
used in the literature to proxy for real yields. Therefore, the regression results in Table
4 provide additional evidence for a positive and statistically significant impact of inflation
disagreement on real yields.
D Real and Nominal Yield Volatilities
We now test whether real and nominal yield volatilities increase with disagreement about
inflation. Table 5 presents standardized coefficients and Newey-West adjusted t-statistics
with 12 lags for SPF in columns 2 to 6 and MSC in columns 7 to 11. In both regressions,
we control for the mean and volatility of inflation. Like the real and nominal yield levels,
the coefficients for disagreement are positive and economically significant for SPF and MSC
for all maturities. Table 5 shows that an increase in disagreement by one standard deviation
of SPF (0.339%) and MSC (1.584%) raises the two year real yield volatility by 52.3% and
33.2% of its standard deviation (0.298%) and the one year nominal yield volatility by 59.7%
and 47.4% of its standard deviation (0.256%). The results are similar for other maturities.
E Break-Even Inflation and Inflation Risk Premium
We find that inflation disagreement drives a wedge between real and nominal yields. The
break-even inflation rate for maturity T is the difference between the nominal and real yield
of a T -year bond. The corresponding inflation risk premium is the break-even inflation
rate minus expected inflation (ExpInf) plus a convexity adjustment
(
0.5 SigInf2
)
.23 For
each maturity, we regress the break-even inflation rate and the inflation risk premium on
disagreement about inflation (DisInf) based on SPF (columns 2 to 4) and MSC (columns
5 to 7). Regression model 1 contains expected inflation (ExpInf) as additional explanatory
variable and regression model 2 controls for the volatility of inflation (SigInf).
Inflation disagreement raises the break-even inflation rate and the inflation risk premium
at all maturities. In the two top panels in Table 6, the coefficient estimates for disagreement
are positive and statistically significant, at least at the 5% level, for SPF and MSC. All
coefficients are economically significant. Specifically, an increase in disagreement by one
standard deviation of SPF (0.339%) and MSC (1.584%) raises the two year break-even
inflation rate by 31.9% and 55.1% of its standard deviation (1.761%). The results are similar
for other maturities and regression model 2.
23See Subsection B in Section I for details.
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Table 5: Inflation Disagreement and Real and Nominal Yield Volatilities. The
table reports results from OLS regressions of real and nominal yield volatilities on disagree-
ment about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), and the volatility of inflation
(SigInf). The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags. Regression coeffi-
cients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are predicted by a GARCH(1, 1) model with an
ARMA(1, 1) mean equation over multiple horizons (T). Samples: Q3-1981 to Q2-2014 and
January 1978 to June 2014.
Survey of Professional Forecasters Surveys of Consumers
Real Yield Volatilities
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y 2y 3y 5y 7y 10y
DisInf 0.523 0.560 0.624 0.700 0.749 0.332 0.387 0.420 0.447 0.471
t-stat 8.13 8.76 8.61 9.32 9.52 1.97 2.16 2.15 2.04 1.97
ExpInf 0.018 0.065 0.081 0.055 0.025 0.074 0.110 0.137 0.129 0.108
t-stat 0.20 0.75 0.94 0.60 0.25 0.61 0.96 1.20 1.02 0.80
SigInf 0.238 0.228 0.183 0.114 0.016 0.391 0.380 0.351 0.305 0.219
t-stat 2.17 2.08 1.84 1.40 0.22 2.87 2.87 2.66 2.19 1.51
adj. R2 0.40 0.44 0.50 0.56 0.57 0.28 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.31
N 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132 132
Nominal Yield Volatilities
Maturity 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y 1y 2y 3y 4y 5y
DisInf 0.597 0.606 0.567 0.656 0.644 0.474 0.464 0.442 0.501 0.511
t-stat 5.24 5.20 5.94 6.92 8.13 4.40 4.03 4.01 3.67 3.65
ExpInf 0.287 0.265 0.260 0.204 0.205 0.287 0.261 0.283 0.170 0.126
t-stat 2.90 2.74 2.44 2.25 2.31 1.60 1.44 1.50 0.96 0.68
SigInf 0.129 0.116 0.113 0.088 0.063 0.174 0.174 0.150 0.153 0.114
t-stat 1.37 1.21 1.15 1.09 0.81 2.45 2.26 2.08 1.99 1.45
adj. R2 0.55 0.54 0.48 0.56 0.53 0.52 0.47 0.46 0.42 0.38
N 132 132 132 132 132 438 438 438 438 438
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In the two bottom panels in Table 6, the coefficient estimates for disagreement are
again positive and statistically significant, at least at the 5% level, for SPF and MSC at all
maturities. The effect of inflation disagreement on the inflation risk premium is economically
significant. An increase in disagreement by one standard deviation of SPF (0.339%) and
MSC (1.584%) raises the two year inflation risk premium by 52.6% and 62.6% of its standard
deviation (2.475%). Like the break-even inflation rate regressions, the results for the inflation
risk premium are similar for other maturities and regression model 2.
F Economic Channel
We now provide evidence for the economic channel through which disagreement affects yields.
First, inflation disagreement raises the cross-sectional consumption growth volatility. The
top panel of Table 7 shows two regression specifications (columns 2 to 3). In the first spec-
ification, we regress CEX cross-sectional consumption growth volatility on MSC inflation
disagreement and time-dummies that control for changes in the definition of food consump-
tion and for missing data at the beginning of 1986 and 1996 due to changes in the household
identification numbers. The second specification contains the CEX cross-sectional income
growth volatility as control. The coefficient estimates on inflation disagreement in both
regressions are positive with t-statistics of 2.22 and 2.89, respectively. Adding expected in-
flation and the volatility of inflation as additional explanatory variables into both regressions,
shown in the bottom panel of Table 7 (columns 2 to 3), produces slightly lower coefficient
estimates with t-statistics of 1.94 and 2.29. In the regressions shown in Table 7, we lag DisInf
by two months. We motivate lagging DisInf given the quarterly frequency of CEX interviews
for a household. Even if the survey participants adjust consumption contemporaneously with
inflation beliefs, current innovations in consumption due to DisInf are reflected in CEX the
earliest within the same month and the latest with a two month lag.
To provide further evidence for our economic channel, we consider three different classes
of securities for which we expect increased trading when inflation disagreement is higher.
First, inflation disagreement increases trading in nominal Treasury bonds. The top and
bottom of column 4 in Table 7 shows a statistically positive relation between MSC inflation
disagreement and trading in Treasuries measured by the volatility of total Treasury volume
scaled by outstanding treasuries. The regressions differ in that in the bottom regression we
add in ExpInf and SigInf as controls. The univariate regression produce a t-statistic of 2.33,
while the multivariate regression produces a t-statistic of 3.78.
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Table 6: Break-Even Inflation and Inflation Risk Premium. The table reports results
from OLS regressions of break-even inflation and inflation risk premium on disagreement
about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation (ExpInf), and the volatility of inflation (SigInf).
Break-even inflation is the difference between nominal and real yields and the inflation risk
premium is the break-even inflation rate minus expected inflation (ExpInf) plus a convexity
adjustment
(
0.5 SigInf2
)
. The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags.
Regression coefficients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are predicted by a GARCH(1, 1)
model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation over multiple horizons (T). Samples: Q3-1981 to
Q2-2014 and January 1978 to June 2014.
Survey of Professionals Survey of Consumers
Break-Even Inflation (BEIR)
Maturity 2y 3y 5y 2y 3y 5y
DisInf 0.319 0.358 0.397 0.551 0.597 0.647
t-stat 2.98 3.41 4.15 5.31 5.45 5.92
ExpInf 0.533 0.498 0.467 0.400 0.357 0.316
t-stat 6.77 6.59 6.72 5.47 5.69 6.06
adj. R2 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.63 0.64 0.67
N 132 132 132 132 132 132
DisInf 0.407 0.436 0.469 0.604 0.644 0.693
t-stat 4.95 5.03 5.44 5.12 5.18 5.52
ExpInf 0.438 0.411 0.383 0.314 0.278 0.238
t-stat 4.23 3.76 3.54 4.53 3.69 3.12
SigInf -0.201 -0.181 -0.172 -0.182 -0.163 -0.157
t-stat -2.63 -2.44 -2.41 -1.89 -1.84 -2.15
adj. R2 0.48 0.47 0.47 0.65 0.66 0.69
N 132 132 132 132 132 132
Inflation Risk Premium (IRP)
DisInf 0.526 0.568 0.592 0.626 0.725 0.813
t-stat 4.89 5.77 6.54 3.64 4.26 5.24
ExpInf -0.466 -0.348 -0.137 -0.577 -0.487 -0.304
t-stat -1.70 -1.43 -0.70 -2.09 -2.09 -1.77
adj. R2 0.36 0.34 0.32 0.44 0.48 0.56
N 132 132 132 132 132 132
DisInf 0.245 0.349 0.464 0.441 0.576 0.723
t-stat 3.72 4.24 4.92 6.44 5.94 5.91
ExpInf -0.164 -0.105 0.012 -0.276 -0.241 -0.150
t-stat -1.54 -0.87 0.09 -3.55 -2.82 -1.66
SigInf 0.641 0.509 0.305 0.630 0.506 0.309
t-stat 8.02 5.92 3.30 11.64 8.05 4.46
adj. R2 0.65 0.51 0.38 0.76 0.69 0.63
N 132 132 132 132 132 132
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Second, inflation disagreement increases trading in interest rate futures. We use open
interest in interest rate futures scaled by open interest in financial futures and present the
evidence for this trading channel in column 5 of Table 7. The t-statistics for the regression
coefficients on MSC inflation disagreement are 2.60 (univariate) and 2.99 (multivariate using
ExpInf and SigInf), respectively.
Third, inflation disagreement raises trading in inflation swaps. The univariate regression
of inflation swap trading on MSC DisInf produces a t-statistics of 4.35. The multivariate
regression, shown in the bottom panel of Table 7, does not yield a statistically significant
coefficient estimate, which is likely caused by multicollinearity.24 We measure inflation swap
trading by detrending aggregated inflation notionals in both regressions.
G Robustness
We check the robustness of our empirical results by analyzing different measures for de-
pendent and independent variables for our empirical tests in the Internet Appendix. The
different measures that we consider are: subtracting realized inflation from nominal yields
to determine realized real yields, subtracting expected inflation estimated by an ARMA(1,1)
from nominal yields to determine real yields, using an E-GARCH model instead of a GARCH
model when estimating yield volatilities, using nominal yields extracted from U.S. Treasury
security prices by the method of Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2007), using the variance
and interquartile range to measure disagreement for both SPF and MSC, and using realized
or lagged realized inflation and their GARCH volatilities instead of predicted inflation and
its volatility.
We also check the robustness of our empirical results by controlling for variables that
effect our dependent variables and are correlated with inflation disagreement. Specifically, we
consider the volatility of consumption growth, the volatility of GDP growth, the volatility
of industrial production, the Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015) uncertainty measure, the
Baker, Bloom, and Davis (2015) uncertainty measure, disagreement about GDP growth, and
disagreement about earnings forecasts as additional control variables. Finally, we add lagged
disagreement to address potential econometric issues with the persistence of disagreement.
The robustness checks produce coefficient estimates, statistical significance, and economic
significance for inflation disagreement which are similar to the ones we report in the paper.
24The regression produces a high F-statistic with an insignificant t-statistic for each variable.
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Table 7: Cross-Sectional Consumption Growth Volatility and Trading. The table
reports OLS regression results. Dependent variables are cross-sectional consumption growth
volatility, volatility of U.S. government bond trading volume, open interest of interest rate
futures scaled by open interest in financial futures, and detrended inflation swap notional
amounts. Explanatory variables are disagreement about inflation (DisInf), expected inflation
(ExpInf), the volatility of inflation (SigInf), and CEX cross-sectional income growth volatility
(SigInc). The CEX based regression contains a time-dummy and DisInf, ExpInf, and SigInf
are lagged by two months. The t-statistics (t-stat) are Newey-West corrected with 12 lags.
Regression coefficients are standardized. ExpInf and SigInf are predicted by a GARCH(1, 1)
model with an ARMA(1, 1) mean equation. Samples: April 1984 - December 2012, January
2001 - August 2013, April 1986 - December 2013, May 2005 - February 2012.
CEX CEX Volatility Open Inflation
Consumption Consumption of Interest Swaps
Volatility I Volatility II Volume Ratio
DisInf 0.162 0.146 0.332 0.314 0.265
t-stat 2.22 2.89 2.33 2.60 4.35
SigInc 0.303
t-stat 4.31
adj. R2 0.37 0.49 0.10 0.10 0.06
N 345 330 151 333 70
DisInf 0.145 0.127 0.549 0.282 0.153
t-stat 1.94 2.29 3.78 2.99 1.34
ExpInf 0.036 0.068 -0.356 0.080 0.080
t-stat 0.43 1.06 -2.45 0.66 0.67
SigInf -0.159 -0.069 -0.577 -0.402 0.228
t-stat -2.24 -0.96 -3.15 -3.70 1.27
SigInc 0.281
t-stat 3.92
adj. R2 0.40 0.50 0.31 0.28 0.05
N 345 330 151 333 70
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III Model-Based Quantitative Evidence
Based on our theoretical and empirical evidence, we present a dynamic model that fits
moments of inflation, inflation disagreement, and real and nominal yields and implies rea-
sonable Sharpe ratios for inflation risk to quantitatively reproduce the impact of inflation
disagreement on yield curves.
A Model
The exogenous real aggregate output process Ct follows a geometric Brownian motion with
dynamics given by
dCt = μCCt dt+ σCCt dzC,t, C0 > 0, (23)
where zC represents a real shock. The dynamics of the price level Πt and the unobservable
expected inflation rate xt are
dΠt = xtΠt dt+ σΠΠt dzΠ,t, dxt = κ (x¯− xt) dt+ σx dzx,t, Π0 = 1, (24)
where zΠ,t represents a nominal shock. The three Brownian motions zC,t, zΠ,t, and zx,t are
uncorrelated.
Investors agree on the long run mean x¯ and the speed of mean reversion κ but have
different beliefs about the volatility of expected inflation, σx.
25 The dynamics of the price
level and the best estimator for expected inflation as perceived by investor i are26
dΠt = x
i
tΠt dt+ σΠΠt dz
i
Π,t, dx
i
t = κ
(
x¯− xit
)
dt+ σˆix dz
i
Π,t, x
i
0 ∼ N
(
μix¯,0, σ
2
xi0
)
.(25)
The volatility σˆix is a function of κ and σ
i
x. Investors observe the price level for a sufficiently
long time so that the perceived volatility, σˆix, has reached its steady state level.
27
25We model disagreement about the volatility of expected inflation because this leads to zero disagreement
in the steady-state and to a tractable stochastic disagreement process.
26See Liptser and Shiryaev (1974a) and Liptser and Shiryaev (1974b).
27The steady state level is σˆix = σΠ
(√
κ2 +
(
σix
σΠ
)2
− κ
)
. Note that the perceived volatility of expected
inflation σˆix is lower than σ
i
x, due to learning.
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which summarizes current disagreement about expected inflation. Specifically,
dz2Π,t = dz
1
Π,t −Δtdt, Δt =
x2t − x1t
σΠ
. (26)
The disagreement process Δt follows an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process
dΔt = −βΔtdt+ σΔdz1Π,t, β =
κσΠ + σˆ
2
x
σΠ
, σΔ =
σˆ2x − σˆ1x
σΠ
. (27)
The dynamics of the likelihood ratio λt are
dλt = Δtλtdz
1
Π,t. (28)
We determine the disagreement measure over the horizon T − t in the next Proposition.
Proposition 5. The disagreement measure is
Dt,T ≡ D
(
Δ2t , T − t
)
=
σ2Δ
4β
+
1
4β (T − t)
(
Δ2t −
σ2Δ
2β
)(
1− e−2β(T−t)) . (29)
Disagreement is strictly increasing in Δ2t and converges to
1
2
Δ2t and
σ2Δ
4β
if T goes to t
and infinity, respectively. Hence, the instantaneous disagreement measure is given by 1
2
Δ2t
and the long-run disagreement measure equals
σ2Δ
4β
. In the empirical section, we measure
disagreement as the standard deviation of expected inflation across investors, which in the
model is 1
2
σΠ
1
κ
(1− e−κ) | Δt |. Therefore, the empirical disagreement measure is strictly
increasing in D (Δ(t)2, T − t) for any maturity T − t.
Each investor solves the consumption-savings problem given in equation (1). We conclude
the description of the model by specifying an external habit process which helps match asset
pricing moments.28 Specifically,
log(Ht) = log(H0)e
−δt + δ
∫ t
0
e−δ(t−a) log(Ca) da, δ > 0, (30)
where δ describes the dependence of Ht on the history of aggregate output. Relative log
output ωt = log(Ct/Ht), a state variable in the model, follows a mean reverting process
dωt = δ(ω¯ − ωt) dt+ σC dzC,t, ω¯ = (μC − σ2C/2)/δ. (31)
Equilibrium consumption allocations and state price densities are given in Proposition 1.
28See Abel (1990), Abel (1999), and Chan and Kogan (2002).
Investors’ nominal innovation processes are linked through the disagreement process Δt,
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B Real Yields
We provide closed-form solutions of real bond prices in the next proposition.
Proposition 6. The real bond price, when γ is an integer is
Bt,T =
γ∑
k=0
wktB
k
t,T . (32)
The stochastic weights wkt sum up to one and are given by
wkt =
(
γ
k
)
λ
k
γ
t(
1 + λ
1
γ
t
)γ = (γ
k
)
f(λt)
γ−k(1− f(λt)k. (33)
Bkt,T is an exponential quadratic function of the state vector Y1,t = (Δt, ωt):
Bkt,T = exp
(AkB(T − t) + BkB(T − t)′Y1,t + Y ′1,tCkB(T − t)Y1,t) , (34)
where the coefficients AkB(·),BkB(·), CkB(·) are solutions to ordinary differential equations sum-
marized in the Internet Appendix.
The bond price in equation (32) is a weighted average of “artificial” bond prices that
belong to the class of quadratic Gaussian term structure models. To gain intuition, we
inspect the real short rate rt which is the limit of the bond yield as maturity T approaches
t:
rt = ρ+ γμC − 1
2
γ(γ + 1)σ2C︸ ︷︷ ︸
CRRA
− δ(γ − 1)ωt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Habit
+
(
1− 1
γ
)
f(λt)(1− f(λt))1
2
Δ2t︸ ︷︷ ︸
Disagreement
. (35)
We see from equation (35) that the real short rate decomposes into the real short rate in
an economy with a representative investor who has CRRA preferences and two additional
terms. The additional terms account for habit preferences and inflation disagreement. The
impact from inflation disagreement on the real yield curve depends on the consumption share
f(λt), risk aversion γ, and the instantaneous disagreement measure
1
2
Δ2t . The real short rate
does not depend on disagreement if γ = 1 and is increasing in disagreement when γ > 1 (the
opposite is true when γ < 1).
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C Nominal Yields
We provide closed-form solutions of the nominal price of a nominal bond in the next propo-
sition.
Proposition 7. The nominal bond price, when γ is an integer, is
Pt,T =
γ∑
k=0
wkt P
k
t,T , (36)
where wkt is given in equation (33). P
k
t,T is an exponential quadratic function of the state
vector Yt = (x
1
t ,Δt, ωt):
P kt,T = exp
(AkP (T − t) + BkP (T − t)′Yt + Y ′t CkP (T − t)Yt) , (37)
where the coefficients AkP (·),BkP (·), CkP (·) are solutions to ordinary differential equations sum-
marized in the Internet Appendix.
Similarly to the real bond price, the nominal bond price can be expressed as a weighed
average of artificial bond prices that belong to the class of quadratic Gaussian term structure
models. Taking the limit of the nominal bond yield as the maturity T approaches t, we obtain
the nominal short rate
rP,t = rt + ftx
1
t + (1− ft)x2t − σ2Π. (38)
We see from equation (38) that the nominal short rate is the sum of the real short rate,
the consumption share weighted average expected inflation belief, and a Jensen’s inequality
term. Thus, the consumption share weighted average belief replaces expected inflation in a
standard economy with homogeneous beliefs. The intuition for this is straight forward; when
an investor has a larger consumption share, her view is more important in determining the
price of the nominal bond.
D Calibration
We set the preference parameters (ρ, γ, δ) to match the level of nominal yields. The con-
sumption parameters (μC , σC) are from Chan and Kogan (2002). The inflation parameters
(x¯, κ, σx) and disagreement parameters (σ
1
x, σ
2
x) match the mean, standard deviation, and
autocorrelation of the consensus belief and disagreement in SPF. We set the belief of the
econometrician such that σˆx equals (σˆ
1
x + σˆ
2
x)/2. We use SPF instead of MSC because it
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explicitly asks professionals about CPI growth and thus leads to lower disagreement. The
last parameter σΠ matches the volatility of inflation. Table 8 reports the parameters.
Table 8: Parameters
Parameter Description Value
Investors
ρ Time preference parameter 0.006
γ Common risk aversion 7
δ Habit parameter 0.050
f0 Initial consumption allocation 0.5
Consumption
μC Expected consumption growth 0.0172
σC Volatility of consumption growth 0.0332
Inflation
σΠ Inflation volatility 0.02
x¯ Long run mean of expected inflation 0.0317
κ Mean reversion of expected inflation 0.19
σˆx Volatility of expected inflation 0.01
Disagreement
σˆ1x Estimated volatility of expected inflation investor 1 0.0044
σˆ2x Estimated volatility of expected inflation investor 2 0.0156
To analyze the quantitative implications of the model, we generate 10,000 sample paths
of 50 years of data by simulating from the model under the belief of the econometrician (σx)
instead of the belief of one of the investors (σ1x or σ
2
x). All statistics are based on averages
across the 10,000 sample paths.29 Table 9 shows the mean, volatility, and autocorrelation of
the consensus forecast in the first panel and disagreement in the second panel. We compute
the mean and volatility of expected inflation across investors to determine the consensus
belief and disagreement. The model matches the mean, volatility, and to a lesser extent
the autocorrelation of the consensus belief and disagreement. Table 10 reports the mean,
standard deviation, and autocorrelation of real and nominal yields in the model and in the
data. The model matches the level and volatility of real and nominal yields. The persistence
of nominal yields in the model is lower than in the data, that is, the average autocorrelation
across maturities is 0.65 in the model and 0.89 in the data.30
29Our model, as most heterogeneous belief models, is not stationary and thus we cannot compute uncon-
ditional moments.
30The mean, volatility, and Sharpe ratio of the market portfolio defined as a claim to aggregate output
are 3.8%, 16.4%, and 0.23, respectively.
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Table 9: Disagreement in the Model and the Data. The table reports mean, volatility,
and annual autocorrelation for the consensus belief and disagreement about inflation. We
compute the mean and volatility of expected inflation across investors to determine the
consensus belief and disagreement. SPF statistics are based on the Survey of Professional
Forecasters available at the quarterly frequency from Q3−1981 to Q2−2014. Model statistics
are based on averages across 10,000 sample paths of 50 years of simulated data under the
belief of the econometrician.
Model SPF
Consensus Belief
Average 0.032 0.031
Volatility 0.013 0.012
Autocorrelation 0.703 0.683
Disagreement
Average 0.005 0.007
Volatility 0.004 0.003
Autocorrelation 0.168 0.190
E Quantitative Effects of Inflation Disagreement
Figure 8 shows real and nominal yields with maturities ranging from 1 to 5 years for two
realizations of current disagreement Δ. In the two plots, the black solid line corresponds to
the steady state level of Δ, which is 0, and the blue dashed line corresponds to a one standard
deviation increase in Δ, which is 0.5143. The plots show that inflation disagreement has an
economically significant impact on real and nominal yields. The economic magnitudes are
comparable to the data. Specifically, an increase in disagreement by one standard deviation
raises the two year real yield by 0.94% and the one year nominal yield by 1.43%. The effects
in the data are 0.407× 1.976 = 0.80% for the two year real yield and 0.354× 3.124 = 1.11%
for the one year nominal yield. The economic significance for longer maturities is lower in
the model than in the data because disagreement is less persistent in the model.
Table 11 shows regression results of nominal and real yield levels and volatilities on
disagreement. As in the empirical analysis, the t-statistics are Newey-West corrected with 12
lags and coefficients are standardized in all four univariate regressions. First, the coefficients
and t-statistics for the real and nominal level regressions are similar to the data at the short
end. For longer maturities, the coefficients are smaller in the model. This is driven by
the lower persistence of disagreement and yields in the model than in the data. Second, the
volatility regressions are also close to the data counter parts, especially for shorter maturities.
Similarly to level regressions, we see a steeper decline in the coefficients in the model relative
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Table 10: Yields in the Model and the Data. The table reports summary statistics for
real and nominal yields. Quarterly real yields are from Chernov and Mueller (2012) merged
with TIPS yields from Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010) for the period Q3-1981 to Q2-
2014. Monthly nominal Fama-Bliss discount bond yields are from CRSP for the period
January 1978 to June 2014. Model statistics are based on averages across 10,000 sample
paths of 50 years of simulated real and nominal yields and their volatilities under the belief
of the econometrician.
Real Yields Nominal Yields
Maturity Model Data Model Data
Average
1 0.021 0.052 0.049
2 0.021 0.019 0.053 0.052
3 0.022 0.020 0.053 0.054
4 0.023 0.054 0.056
5 0.024 0.023 0.055 0.058
Volatility
1 0.028 0.029 0.034
2 0.023 0.020 0.025 0.034
3 0.021 0.018 0.022 0.034
4 0.019 0.021 0.033
5 0.019 0.016 0.020 0.032
Autocorrelation
1 0.45 0.47 0.75
2 0.59 0.66 0.60 0.76
3 0.68 0.70 0.68 0.77
4 0.73 0.73 0.76
5 0.76 0.73 0.76 0.78
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Figure 8: Real and Nominal Yields
The left plot shows real yields and the right plot shows nominal yields as function of time to
maturity for two realizations of current disagreement Δ. The black solid line corresponds to
the steady state level of Δ and the blue dashed line corresponds to a one standard deviation
increase in Δ. Both plots show that an increase in inflation disagreement has an economically
significant positive impact on real and nominal yields.
to the data as the maturity increases. The volatility of yields are decaying quicker in the
model than in the data. Hence, we would except the effect of disagreement on the volatility
of yields at longer maturities to be lower in the model.
F Inflation Risk Premium and Sharpe Ratio
We specify a simple asset structure that dynamically completes the market to inspect quan-
titatively the inflation risk premium and the corresponding Sharpe ratio.
Suppose investors can continuously trade an inflation-protected money market account
with real price Bt,0, a nominal money market account with nominal price Pt,0, and a security,
called a stock, with real price St and unit volatility that is locally perfectly correlated with
real consumption growth. The dynamics of the inflation-protected money market account
and stock in equilibrium are
dBt,0 = Bt,0 rt dt, B0,0 = 1, and dSt = St ((rt + θC,t) dt+ dzC,t) , S0 = 1,
where θC,t = γ σC is the market price of risk for the real shock zC,t. The dynamics of the
real price of the nominal money market account, pt,0 = Pt,0/Πt, in equilibrium are
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Table 11: Disagreement Regressions. The table reports results from OLS regressions of
the level and volatility of real and nominal yields on disagreement about inflation. We use the
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) to measure inflation disagreement (Q3-1981 to Q2-
2014). Quarterly real yields are from Chernov and Mueller (2012) merged with TIPS yields
from Gu¨rkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2010). Monthly nominal Fama-Bliss discount bond
yields are from CRSP. Real and nominal yield volatilities are computed by a GARCH(1, 1)
with an AR(1) mean equation. Model coefficients and standardized t-statistics are based
on averages across 10,000 sample paths of 50 years of simulated real and nominal yields
and their volatilities under the belief of the econometrician. The t-statistics (t-stat) are
Newey-West corrected with 12 lags.
Real Yields Nominal Yields
Maturity Model SPF Model SPF
Level
1 year 0.644 0.598 0.465
t-stat 7.77 6.57 3.65
adj. R2 0.43 0.38 0.21
2 year 0.497 0.407 0.453 0.466
t-stat 5.56 3.48 4.67 3.64
adj. R2 0.27 0.16 0.24 0.21
3 year 0.390 0.397 0.354 0.469
t-stat 4.20 3.33 3.55 3.68
adj. R2 0.18 0.15 0.16 0.21
4 year 0.318 0.289 0.469
t-stat 3.35 2.87 3.75
adj. R2 0.13 0.12 0.21
5 year 0.268 0.388 0.245 0.480
t-stat 2.80 3.23 2.42 3.90
adj. R2 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.21
Volatility
1 year 0.609 0.566 0.709
t-stat 8.27 7.06 5.10
adj. R2 0.38 0.33 0.50
2 year 0.569 0.604 0.499 0.707
t-stat 7.21 8.51 5.66 5.10
adj. R2 0.33 0.36 0.26 0.50
3 year 0.519 0.648 0.429 0.665
t-stat 6.18 9.27 4.53 5.75
adj. R2 0.28 0.41 0.20 0.44
4 year 0.464 0.366 0.732
t-stat 5.28 3.70 6.47
adj. R2 0.23 0.15 0.53
5 year 0.407 0.700 0.313 0.712
t-stat 4.50 8.35 3.09 7.11
adj. R2 0.18 0.49 0.12 0.50
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dPt,0 = Pt,0
((
rP,t − xit + σ2Π
)
dt− σΠ dziΠ,t
)
,
= Pt,0
((
rt − σΠθiΠ,t
)
dt− σΠ dziΠ,t
)
, P0,0 = 1, i = 1, 2,
(39)
where θiΠ,t denotes the market price of risk of the perceived inflation shock z
i
Π,t. Specifically,
θ1Π,t = (ft − 1)Δt and θ2Π,t = ftΔt. (40)
An increase in inflation is bad news for real asset prices and thus the market price of risk for
the inflation shock has a different sign then the Sharpe ratio of the asset. The inflation risk
premium and the Sharpe ratio for the nominal money market account perceived by investor
i are
IRPi = −σΠθiΠ,t and SRi =
IRPi
σΠ
= −θiΠ,t.
Hence, investors have opposing views on the real return of the nominal money market account
due to their different views about expected inflation.
We focus on the case where the first investor takes a long position in the nominal money
market account because she perceives a positive inflation risk premium due to a lower ex-
pected inflation rate than the second investor, that is, Δ ≥ 0. The left plot of Figure 9 shows
that the inflation risk premium and the Sharpe ratio perceived by the first investor are strictly
increasing in disagreement Δ. The maximal Sharpe ratio and inflation risk premium when
both investors share output equally (f = 0.5) and Δ = 0.5143, which corresponds to a one
standard deviation increase from the steady state of zero, are 0.2571 and 0.0051, respec-
tively. As shown more generally in Proposition 4, the right plot of Figure 9 confirms that
the inflation risk premium and the Sharpe ratio perceived by the first investor declines when
her consumption share in the economy increases. When her consumption share is close to
one, then prices reflect only her view about inflation, and thus the inflation risk premium
and the Sharpe ratio are close to zero. However, in this case the second investor perceives
the highest Sharpe ratio and inflation risk premium in absolute terms because he is short
the nominal money market account.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 49 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1532
Disagreement 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
S
ha
rp
e 
R
at
io
-0.2
0
0.2
In
fla
tio
n 
R
is
k 
P
re
m
iu
m
10-3
-5
0
5


 
 
Consumption Share f
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
S
ha
rp
e 
R
at
io
-0.5
0
0.5
In
fla
tio
n 
R
is
k 
P
re
m
iu
m
-0.01
0
0.01


 
 
Figure 9: Sharpe Ratio and Inflation Risk Premium
The left plot shows the inflation risk premium and Sharpe ratio perceived by the first investor
as strictly increasing functions of disagreement Δ. The second investor perceives a negative
inflation risk premium and Sharpe ratio and thus is short the nominal money market account.
The right plot shows that the inflation risk premium and Sharpe ratio perceived by the first
investor goes down when her consumption share in the economy increases.
IV Concluding Remarks
Surveys of consumers and professionals show that there is disagreement about inflation. But
does this disagreement affect asset prices or individual consumption? We consider a pure
exchange economy with a frictionless, complete securities market to answer this question
theoretically. We show that disagreement about inflation has a strong impact on the cross-
sectional consumption growth volatility as well as real and nominal yield curves. Intuitively,
investors make different consumption savings decisions based on their different beliefs about
real returns on investments which raises the volatility of individual consumption and yields.
Each investor thinks the high real returns on their investments will make them wealthier and
thus interest rates have to rise for consumption markets to clear. In addition, disagreement
drives a wedge between real and nominal yields curves due to changes in the investment
opportunity set caused by speculative trade in equilibrium.
We find empirical support for our theoretical predictions using a survey of consumers
(MSC) and a survey of professional forecasters (SPF). Specifically, real and nominal yields are
higher and more volatile when there is inflation disagreement which also increase the break-
even inflation rate and inflation risk premiums. The effects are economically and statistically
significant. Empirically, an inflation disagreement increase of one standard deviation raises
real and nominal yield levels and volatilities, break-even inflation, and the inflation risk
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premium by at least 30% of their respective standard deviations. We provide empirical
support for the economic channel through which disagreement effect asset prices by showing
that there is more trade in nominal Treasuries, interest rate derivatives, and inflation swaps
and there is higher cross-sectional consumption growth volatility when disagreement about
inflation is high. Calibrating a dynamic model where investors disagree about the dynamics
of expected inflation to disagreement, inflation, and yield data reproduces the economically
and statistically significant impact of inflation disagreement on real and nominal yield curves.
We document that inflation disagreement raises individual consumption volatilities, real
interest rates and their volatilities which seems to be an undesirable outcome for policy-
makers. Clearly, it is optimal for investors to trade on their inflation beliefs in our com-
plete market economy. However, all investors cannot have correct beliefs and thus it is not
clear whether trading on their beliefs is ex-post welfare improving. Recent studies such as
Brunnermeier, Simsek, and Xiong (2014), Gilboa, Samuelson, and Schmeidler (2014), and
Heyerdahl-Larsen and Walden (2015) show that policies that reduce disagreement, restrict
trade on disagreement, or taxes, and hence avoid an increase in individual consumption
volatilities, may be socially optimal in this case. Better understanding how central banks
respond to inflation disagreement and potentially impact bond markets could be fruitful for
future work.
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A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. See Detemple and Murthy (1994) or Basak (2005) and the references
therein.
Proof of Theorem 1. We split this proof into three parts
(i) Real yields:
Let ξ0T denote the state price density when there is no disagreement. Specifically,
ξ0t = e
−ρtC−γt H
γ−1
t .
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By Assumption 1, there is no disagreement about the distribution of output Ct and
the habit Ht and, thus, the real price of a real bond when there is no disagreement and
the representative investor has belief P0 is
B0t,T = E
0
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
= E1t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
= E2t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
.
The real price of a real bond with disagreement is
Bt,T = E
1
t
[
ξ1T
ξ1t
]
= E1t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
(
f(λT )
f(λt)
)−γ]
.
We have that(
f(λT )
f(λt)
)−γ
=
(
1 + (yλT )
1
γ
1 + (yλt)
1
γ
)γ
=
(
ft + (1− ft)
(
λT
λt
) 1
γ
)γ
,
and, hence,
Bt,T = E
1
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
(
ft + (1− ft)
(
λT
λt
) 1
γ
)γ]
.
Suppose γ = 1. Then the bond price simplifies to
Bt,T = E
1
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
(
ft + (1− ft)
(
λT
λt
))]
= ftE
1
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
+ (1− ft)E1t
[
λT
λt
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
= ftE
1
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
+ (1− ft)E2t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
= ftB
0
t,T + (1− ft)B0t,T = B0t,T .
This concludes the proof of the case γ = 1.
Consider the function h(x) = x
1
γ , which is strictly increasing and convex if γ < 1 and
strictly concave if γ > 1. Suppose γ > 1 and thus h(x) is strictly concave. The case of
γ < 1 is similar and thus omitted.
The real price of a real bond with disagreement is
Bt,T = E
1
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
(
ft + (1− ft)
(
λT
λt
) 1
γ
)γ]
= E1t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
E1t
⎡⎣ ξ0Tξ0t
E1t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
] (ft + (1− ft)h(λT
λt
))γ⎤⎦
= B0t,T Eˆ
1
t
[(
ft + (1− ft)h
(
λT
λt
))γ]
,
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ically,
ζ1T
ζ1t
≡ dPˆ
1
dP1
=
ξ0T
ξ0t
1
B0t,T
.
We have that
Eˆ1t
[
λT
λt
]
= E1t
[
λT
λt
ζ1T
ζ1t
]
= E2t
[
ζ1T
ζ1t
]
=
E2t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
B0t,T
=
B0t,T
B0t,T
= 1.
Strict concavity of h(·) leads to
fth(1) + (1− ft)h
(
λT
λt
)
< h
(
ft · 1 + (1− ft) · λT
λt
)
.
Hence,
Bt,T = B
0
t,T Eˆ
1
t
[(
ft + (1− ft)h
(
λT
λt
))γ]
< B0t,T Eˆ
1
t
[
h
(
ft · 1 + (1− ft) · λT
λt
)γ]
= B0t,T
(
ft + (1− ft)Eˆ1t
[
λT
λt
])
= B0t,T (ft + (1− ft)) = B0t,T .
(ii) Consumption Growth Volatility
The consumption allocations are
C1t = f(λt) Ct, and C
2
t = (1− f(λt)) Ct, where f(λt) =
1
1 + (yλt)
1
γ
.
The cross-sectional variance of consumption growth from time t to T is
σ2CS(λt, λT ) =
1
4
(
log
(
C1T
C1t
)
− log
(
C2T
C2t
))2
=
1
4
(
log
(
f(λT )
f(λt)
1− f(λt)
1− f(λT )
))2
=
1
4γ2
(
log
(
λT
λt
))2
.
If there is no disagreement, then λt ≡ 1 and thus σ2CS(λt, λT ) = 0.
(iii) Real Yield Volatility
If γ = 1, then real yields with disagreement are equal to real yields when there is no
disagreement and thus the volatility of yields does not depend on disagreement.
Suppose γ = 1. The real price of a real bond with disagreement is
Bt,T = B
0
t,T Eˆ
1
t
[(
ft + (1− ft)h
(
λT
λt
))γ]
,
where Eˆ1t denotes the conditional mean using the bond price B
0
t,T as numeraire. Specif-
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B0t,T , as numeraire. Let y
B
t,T denote the real yield when there is disagreement and y
B0
t,T
the real yield when there is no disagreement. We have that
yBt,T = −
1
T − t log (Bt,T )
= − 1
T − t log
(
B0t,T
)− 1
T − t log
(
Eˆ1t
[(
ft + (1− ft)h
(
λT
λt
))γ])
= yB
0
t,T −
1
T − t log
(
Eˆ1t
[(
ft + (1− ft)h
(
λT
λt
))γ])
. (41)
λt is independent of Ct and Ht and, hence,
Vi
[
yBt,T
] ≥ Vi [yB0t,T] , ∀i = 0, 1, 2,
with equality if the conditional expectation in equation (41) is constant.
Corollary 1. [Independent Multiplicative Decomposition] Consider the probability space
(Ω,F) and the three strictly positive random variables x˜, y˜, and ε˜ with corresponding proba-
bility measures Px, Py, and Pε. Suppose that (i) y˜ and x˜ have unit mean, that is, Ey [y˜] =
Ex[x˜] = 1, (ii) y˜ and x˜ ε˜ are equal in distribution, that is, y˜
d
= x˜ ε˜, and (iii) x˜ and ε˜ are mean
independent, that is, Eε[ε˜ | x˜ = x] = Eε[ε˜] = 1, ∀x. Then the following three statements
hold:
(i)
Ey [g (y˜)] ≤ Ex[g(x˜)],
for all concave functions g,
(ii)
Vy [y˜] ≥ Vx [x˜] ,
(iii) and
Ey
[
(log (y˜))2
] ≥ Ex [(log (x˜))2] ,
if x˜ and ε˜ are independent.
Proof. We split the proof into three parts:
(i) It follows from the definition of equality in distribution, mean independence, and
Jensen’s inequality that
Ey [g (y˜)] = Ey [g (x˜ε˜)] = Ex [Eε [g (x˜ε˜) | x˜]] ≤ Ex [g (Eε [x˜ε˜ | x˜])] = Ex [g (x˜EP [ε˜ | x˜])]
= Ex [g (x˜)] .
where Eˆ1t denotes the conditional mean using the real bond price without disagreement,
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(ii) It follows from the definition of equality in distribution, mean independence, and
Jensen’s inequality that
Vy [y˜] = Vy [x˜ ε˜] = Ey
[
x˜2ε˜2
]− (Ey [x˜ ε˜])2 = Ex [Eε [x˜2ε˜2 | x˜]]− (Ex [Eε [x˜ ε˜ | x˜]])2
= Ex
[
x˜2Eε
[
ε˜2 | x˜]]− (Ex [x˜Eε [ε˜ | x˜]])2 ≥ Ex [x˜2 (Eε [ε˜ | x˜])2]− (Ex [x˜])2
= Ex
[
x˜2
]− (Ex [x˜])2 = Vx [x˜] .
(iii) Since g(x) = log(x)2 is convex for 0 < x < 1 and concave for x > 1, we cannot apply
the first result to show the third result. However, if x˜ and ε˜ are independent, then
Ey
[
(log (y˜))2
]
= Ey
[
(log (x˜ ε˜))2
]
= Ey
[
(log (x˜) + log (ε˜))2
]
= Ex
[
(log (x˜))2
]
+ 2Ey [log (x˜) log (ε˜)] + Eε
[
(log (ε˜))2
]
= Ex
[
(log (x˜))2
]
+ 2Ex [log (x˜)]Eε [log (ε˜)] + Eε
[
(log (ε˜))2
]
.
The first and third terms are non-negative and thus it remains to show that the second
term is nonnegative. We know that x˜ and ε˜ have unit mean and thus the average of
the log of both variables is nonpositive because by Jensen’s inequality
Ex [log (x˜)] ≤ log (Ex [x˜]) = 0.
Hence,
Ex [log (x˜)]Eε [log (ε˜)] ≥ 0,
which concludes the proof of the third statement.
Proof of Proposition 2. We need to show that
Dtη ,tη+τ = −
1
τ
E
η,1
tη
[
log
(
ηtη+τ
ηtη
)]
≥ −1
τ
E1t
[
log
(
λt+τ
λt
)]
= Dt,t+τ ,
which is equivalent to showing that
E
η,1
tη
[
log
(
ηtη+τ
ηtη
)]
≤ E1t
[
log
(
λt+τ
λt
)]
. (42)
The function g(x) = log(x) is concave and thus it follows from Corollary 1 that inequality
(42) is satisfied if ηt and λt satisfy Assumption 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. We split this proof into two parts
(i) Real yields:
Let ξ0T denote the state price density when there is no disagreement. Specifically,
ξ0t = e
−ρtC−γt H
γ−1
t .
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It follows from Assumption 2 that there is no disagreement about the distribution of
output Ct and the habit Ht and thus the real price of a real bond when there is no
disagreement and the representative investor has belief P0 is
B0t,T = E
0
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
= E1t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
= E2t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
.
It follows from Assumption 2 that λt is independent of ξ
0
t and thus the real price of a
real bond with disagreement is
Bt,T = E
1
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
(
f(λt) + (1− f(λt))
(
λT
λt
) 1
γ
)γ]
= E1t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
E1t
[(
f(λt) + (1− f(λt))
(
λT
λt
) 1
γ
)γ]
= B0t,TE
1
t
[(
f(λt) + (1− f(λt))
(
λT
λt
) 1
γ
)γ]
.
Similarly,
Bηtη ,Tη = B
0
tη ,TηE
η,1
tη
[(
f(ηtη) + (1− f(ηtη))
(
ηTη
ηtη
) 1
γ
)γ]
.
We have that τ = Tη − tη = T − t and thus it follows from Assumption 2 that
B0t,t+τ = B
0
tη ,tη+τ . Moreover, ft = f(λt) = f(ηtη) and, hence,
Bt,t+τ = B
0
t,t+τE
1
t
[(
ft + (1− ft)
(
λt+τ
λt
) 1
γ
)γ]
,
Bηtη ,tη+τ = B
0
t,t+τE
η,1
tη
[(
ft + (1− ft)
(
ηtη+τ
ηtη
) 1
γ
)γ]
.
Suppose γ = 1. Then the bond prices simplify to
Bt,t+τ = B
0
t,t+τE
1
t
[
ft + (1− ft)λt+τ
λt
]
= B0t,t+τ ,
Bηtη ,tη+τ = B
0
t,t+τE
η,1
tη
[
ft + (1− ft)
ηtη+τ
ηtη
]
= B0t,t+τ .
This concludes the proof of the case γ = 1.
Define the function g(x) =
(
f + (1− f)x 1γ
)γ
which is strictly concave if γ > 1 and
strictly convex if γ < 1. Suppose γ > 1 and thus h(x) is strictly concave. The case of
γ < 1 is similar and thus omitted. We need to show that Bηtη ,tη+τ < Bt,t+τ , which is
equivalent to showing that
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E
η,1
tη
[
g
(
ηtη+τ
ηtη
)]
< E1t
[
h
(
λt+τ
λt
)]
,
which follows directly from Assumption 2 and Corrolary 1.
(ii) Consumption Growth Volatility
The cross-sectional variance of consumption growth from time t to T in both economies
is
σ2CS(λt, λt+τ ) =
1
4γ2
(
log
(
λt+τ
λt
))2
, and σ2CS(ηtη , ηtη+τ ) =
1
4γ2
(
log
(
ηtη+τ
ηtη
))2
.
Hence, we need to show that
E
η,1
tη
[
σ2CS(ηtη , ηtη+τ )
] ≥ E1t [σ2CS(λt, λt+τ )] ,
which is equivalent to showing that
E
η,1
tη
[(
log
(
ηtη+τ
ηtη
))2]
≥ E1t
[(
log
(
λt+τ
λt
))2]
. (43)
If ηt and λt satisfy Assumption 2 and if ε and λt+τ are independent, then inequality
(43) follows from Corollary 1.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let ξ0T denote the state price density when there is no disagreement
and the representative investor has belief P0. Specifically,
ξ0t = e
−ρtC−γt H
γ−1
t .
The nominal price of a nominal bond when there is no disagreement and the representative
investor has belief Pi is
P¯ it,T = E
i
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
Πt
ΠT
]
, i = 0, 1, 2.
The nominal price of a nominal bond with disagreement is
Pt,T = E
1
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
Πt
ΠT
(
ft + (1− ft)
(
λT
λt
) 1
γ
)γ]
.
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Suppose γ = 1. Then the bond price simplifies to
Pt,T = E
1
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
Πt
ΠT
(
ft + (1− ft)
(
λT
λt
))]
= ftE
1
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
Πt
ΠT
]
+ (1− ft)E1t
[
λT
λt
ξ0T
ξ0t
Πt
ΠT
]
= ftE
1
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
Πt
ΠT
]
+ (1− ft)E2t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
Πt
ΠT
]
= ftP¯
1
t,T + (1− ft)P¯ 2t,T .
It remains to show that
ftP¯
1
t,T + (1− ft)P¯ 2t,T = P¯ 0t,T .
We have for all beliefs indexed by i = 0, 1, 2 that
P¯ it,T = E
i
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
Πt
ΠT
]
= Covit
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
,
Πt
ΠT
]
+ Eit
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
Eit
[
Πt
ΠT
]
.
By Assumption 1, there is no disagreement about the marginal distribution of output and
the habit and, hence,
Bt,T ≡ Eit
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
]
, ∀i = 0, 1, 2.
Hence,
P¯ 1t,T = Cov
1
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
,
Πt
ΠT
]
+ Bt,TE
1
t
[
Πt
ΠT
]
, and P¯ 2t,T = Cov
2
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
,
Πt
ΠT
]
+ Bt,TE
2
t
[
Πt
ΠT
]
.
Multiplying the first equation with ft and the second equation with (1−ft) and adding them
up leads to
Pt,T = ftP¯
1
t,T + (1− ft)P¯ 2t,T = ftCov1t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
,
Πt
ΠT
]
+ (1− ft)Cov2t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
,
Πt
ΠT
]
+ Bt,T
(
ftE
1
t
[
Πt
ΠT
]
+ (1− ft)E2t
[
Πt
ΠT
])
= Cov0t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
,
Πt
ΠT
]
+ Bt,TE
0
t
[
Πt
ΠT
]
= P¯ 0t,T .
This concludes the proof of the case γ = 1.
Consider the function h(x) = x
1
γ , which is strictly convex if γ < 1 and strictly concave if
γ > 1. Suppose γ > 1. The case of γ < 1 is similar and thus omitted.
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The nominal price of a nominal bond with disagreement is
Pt,T = E
1
t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
Πt
ΠT
(
ft + (1− ft)
(
λT
λt
) 1
γ
)γ]
= E1t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
Πt
ΠT
]
E1t
⎡⎣ ξ0Tξ0t ΠtΠT
E1t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
Πt
ΠT
] (ft + (1− ft)h(λT
λt
))γ⎤⎦
= P¯ 1t,T Eˆ
1
t
[(
ft + (1− ft)h
(
λT
λt
))γ]
,
where Eˆ1t denotes the conditional mean using the bond price P¯
1
t,T as numeraire. Specifically,
ζ1T
ζ1t
≡ dPˆ
1
dP1
=
ξ0TΠ
−1
T
ξ0tΠ
−1
t
1
P¯ 1t,T
.
We have that
Eˆ1t
[
λT
λt
]
= E1t
[
λT
λt
ζ1T
ζ1t
]
= E2t
[
ζ1T
ζ1t
]
=
E2t
[
ξ0T
ξ0t
Πt
ΠT
]
P¯ 1t,T
=
P¯ 2t,T
P¯ 1t,T
.
Strict concavity of h(·) implies that
fth(1) + (1− ft)h
(
λT
λt
)
< h
(
ft · 1 + (1− ft) · λT
λt
)
.
Hence,
Pt,T = P¯
1
t,T Eˆ
1
t
[(
ft + (1− ft)h
(
λT
λt
))γ]
< P¯ 1t,T Eˆ
1
t
[
h
(
ft · 1 + (1− ft) · λT
λt
)γ]
= P¯ 1t,T
(
ft + (1− ft)Eˆ1t
[
λT
λt
])
= P¯ 1t,T
(
ft + (1− ft)
P¯ 2t,T
P¯ 1t,T
)
= ftP¯
1
t,T + (1− ft)P¯ 2t,T = P¯ 0t,T .
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose γ = 1. We know from Theorem 1 that Bt,T = B¯
0
t,T if γ = 1.
Similarly, we know from Theorem 3 that Pt,T = P¯
0
t,T if γ = 1. Hence,
Pt,T
Bt,T
=
P¯ 0t,T
B¯0t,T
and thus
the break-even inflation rate does not depend on disagreement.
Counterexamples: Figure 10 shows the difference between the break-even inflation rate in
an economy with and without inflation disagreement as a function of risk aversion. The
price level today is normalized to one. In the high inflation state, it is 1.25. In the low
inflation state, it is 0.9. The second investor thinks that both inflation states are equally
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likely. Suppose the first investor thinks that the probability of a high inflation state is less
likely than the second investors thinks. The red area shows that the break-even inflation
rate is lower with disagreement if γ > 1 and higher if γ < 1. Suppose the first investor thinks
that the probability of a high inflation state is more likely than the second investors thinks.
The blue area shows that the break-even inflation rate is higher with disagreement if γ > 1
and higher if γ < 1.
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Figure 10: Break-Even Inflation Rate in Edgeworth box
This plot shows the difference between the break-even inflation rate in an economy with
and without inflation disagreement as a function of risk aversion. The price level today is
normalized to one and it is 1.25 in the high and 0.9 in the low inflation state tomorrow. The
second investor thinks that both inflation states are equally likely.
Proof of Proposition 4. Straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 5. The disagreement measure is
Dt,T = 1
2 (T − t)E
1
[∫ T
t
Δ2sds
]
=
1
2 (T − t)
∫ T
t
E1
[
Δ2s
]
ds
To evaluate the above we need E1 [Δ2s]. To this end, note that by Ito’s lemma
dΔ2t = 2β
(
σ2Δ
2β
−Δ2t
)
dt− 2βΔtdz1Π,t.
Using the dynamics of Δ2t , we have E
1 [Δ2s] =
σ2Δ
2β
+ e−2β
(
Δ2t − σ
2
Δ
2β
)
. Inserting this back into
the expression for the disagreement measure and integrating yields the result.
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Proof of Proposition 6. Assume γ is integer. The real bond price is Bt,T = E
1
t
[
ξ1T
ξ1t
]
. From
Proposition 1, we have that the SDF is
ξ1t = (y
1)−1e−ρtC−γt H
γ−1
t f(λt)
−γ = (y1)−1e−ρtC−γt H
γ−1
t
(
1 + (yλt)
1
γ
)γ
=
γ∑
k=0
(
γ
k
)
(y1)−1e−ρtC−γt H
γ−1
t (yλt)
k
γ .
Inserting the above into the expression for the bond price we have
γ∑
k=0
wktE
1
t
[(
CT
Ct
)−γ (
HT
Ht
)γ−1(
λT
λt
) k
γ
]
, where wkt =
(
γ
k
)
λ
k
γ
t(
1 + λ
1
γ
t
)γ .
Define
ξkT
ξkt
=
(
CT
Ct
)−γ (
HT
Ht
)γ−1 (
λT
λt
) k
γ
. We can think of this as a stochastic discount factor
in an artificial economy. Applying Ito’s lemma we have
dξkt
ξkt
= −rkt dt− θkt dz, where dz =
(
dzC,t, dz
1
Π,t
)
and
θkt =
(
γσC ,
k
γ
Δt
)
, and rkt = ρ+ γμC −
1
2
γ(γ + 1)σ2C − δ(γ − 1)ωt +
1
2
k
γ
(
1− k
γ
)
Δ2t .
Define the state vector Y1,t = (Δt, ω). We have that Y1,t follows a multidimensional Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process. Moreover, the real short rate in the artificial economies are quadratic
in the state vector and the market prices of risk are linear in the state vector. Hence, the
artificial state price densities are in the class of Quadratic Gaussian Termstructure Models
(QGTM) and the solution to E1t
[(
CT
Ct
)−γ (
HT
Ht
)γ−1 (
λT
λt
) k
γ
]
= E1
[
ξkT
ξkt
]
is an exponential
quadratic function of the state vector with time dependent coefficients that are solutions to
ordinary differential equations.31
Proof of Proposition 7. The proof follows similar steps as in the proof of Proposition 6. In
particular, the bond price can be written as
γ∑
k=0
wktE
1
t
[(
CT
Ct
)−γ (
HT
Ht
)γ−1(
λT
λt
) k
γ Πt
ΠT
]
,
31We derive solutions to bond prices that belong to the class of Quadratic Gaussian Term Structure Models
in the Internet Appendix.
and we can define a set of artificial nominal stochastic discount factors
ξkΠ,T
ξkΠ,t
=
(
CT
Ct
)−γ (
HT
Ht
)γ−1(
λT
λt
) k
γ Πt
ΠT
.
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Applying Ito’s lemma we have
dξkΠ,t
ξkΠ,t
= −rkΠ,tdt− θkΠ,tdz, where θkΠ,t = θkt + σΠ, rkΠ,t = rkΠ,t + x1t +
k
γ
Δt − σ2Π.
Define the state vector Yt = (x
1
t ,Δt, ω). We have that Yt follows a multidimensional Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck process. Moreover, the real short rate in the artificial economies are quadratic
in the state vector and the market prices of risk are linear in the state vector. Hence, the
artificial state price densities are in the class of Quadratic Gaussian Termstructure Models
(QGTM) and thus we can solve for the bond price in closed form up to the solution of
ordinary differential equations.
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